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SOUTH WEST AFRICA IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT: ACT II, SCENE 1
Elizabeth S. Landist
On December 21, 1962, fifteen judges of the International Court of
justice, in nine opinions and one declaration totalling 347 printed pages,
handed down a decision' which may well signal the beginning of extensive
political changes in Southern Africa. Yet despite the importance of the
issues directly and indirectly involved, the fascinating arguments devel-
oped, and the drama of the eight-seven split in the court's decision, the
case remains unknown to the public at large and even to many members
of the Bar.
That the decision remains in relative obscurity is not so astonishing
when one realizes the obstacles in the path of even the most interested
nonspecialist who wants to plow his way through the inch-thick volume
of opinions: first of all, he must master the unfamiliar terminology of
the court and of the mandates system of the League of Nations, distin-
guishing among the various meanings attributed to the same words2 and
never confusing them with different or looser popular usage. He must
further distinguish between, and respond automatically and correctly
to, a whole battery of apparent code numbers, for the key documents'
to which reference is made repeatedly are all subdivided into "Articles."
Finally, he must follow unhesitatingly the intricacies of post-World War
I international maneuvering, which caused the preceding generation of
Americans to throw up its hands in dismay and to withdraw to the rela-
tive safety of the New World.
Nevertheless, with the necessary historical and terminological back-
t Professor of African Studies, American College in Paris. A.B., Mount Holyoke College
1942; M.S. in Pub. Admin., Syracuse Univ. 1943; LL.B., Cornell Univ. 1948; Dr. en Droit,
Univ. of Lyon (France) 1950; Co-Editor, Liberian Code of Laws of 1956.
1 South West Africa Cases, [1962] I.C.J. Rep. 319 [hereinafter cited SWA Cases]. These
cases disposed of the preliminary objections in the cases between Ethiopia and South Africa,
and Liberia and South Africa.
2 See note 114 infra.
3 League of Nations Covenant [hereinafter cited Covenant]; the mandate for South
West Africa [hereinafter cited Mandate]; U.N. Charter [hereinafter cited Charter]; and
Stat. Int'l Ct. of Just.
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ground it is possible to read and understand the South West Africa Cases,
to appreciate their significance in the current Afro-Asian attempts to
end "colonialism" in Southern Africa, and to anticipate the second scene
of Act II of the South West Africa drama. The purpose of this article
s to present such a background and to summarize the opinions of the
court and the judges, so that, as far as possible, the major issues are
clarified and the arguments relating to each issue are presented in juxta-
position.
PROLOGUE
The Setting4
South West Africa is an infertile desert and semidesert area of more
than 300,000 square miles' lying along the South Atlantic athwart the
Tropic of Capricorn. To the south and southeast it is bounded by the
Republic of South Africa; 6 to the east by the British Protectorate of
Bechuanaland; and to the north by the Portuguese territory of Angola.
At the extreme northeast of the country a thin sliver of territory 7 stretches
almost 300 miles east to the border of Northern Rhodesia. Due to lack
of water-there is no permanent watercourse in the country, and most
regions receive less than ten inches of rain annually-stock-raising is the
principal agricultural pursuit. There are considerable mineral deposits
in the northern part of the country, and diamonds are found in relative
abundance in the alluvial sands along several hundred miles of the
southern coastline.'
There are somewhat more than 400,000 Africans9 in South West
4 The literature on South West Africa is pathetically inadequate. Generally the territory
is treated as an adjunct to South Africa, if it is mentioned at all. The best general political
handbook is First, South West Africa (1963) [hereinafter cited First] written by a South
African journalist now under house arrest or in detention for her opposition to apartheid.
The book contains a bibliography. Conditions in South West Africa are summarized in
the annual reports made to the U.N. General Assembly by its Committee on South West
Africa (and its predecessor ad hoc Committee and its successor Special Committee) [all
hereinafter cited SWA Comm.].
5 SWA Comm. 8 (A/2913) (1955) gives the exact area as 317,940 square miles, ex-
luding Walvis Bay (374 square miles), which remains an integral part of the South
African Province of the Cape of Good Hope. Texas has approximately 265,000 square
miles.
6 The former Union of South Africa, as the respondent was when Ethiopia and Liberia
commenced their proceedings, became a republic in 1961. This article refers to the "Union"
in relation to actions which took place before the change and to the "Republic" as to
continuing actions or conditions or as to actions which took place since the Republic came
into existence.
7 The Caprivi Zipfel.
8 SWA Comm. 8 (A/2913) (1955); Boyd & van Rensburg, An Atlas of African Affairs
120-21 (1962); Stamp, Africa: A Study in Tropical Development 486-89 (1953). Ap-
pendix D of First contains information concerning foreign investment in South West
Africa, most of it for mineral exploitation.
9 In Africa south of the Sahara this term refers to relatively pure-blooded indigenous
peoples (i.e., those with no appreciable Caucasian or Asian ancestry). "Old Africa hands"
and resident whites tend to use the term "native," but this has become a term of opprobrium
to those to whom it is applied.
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Africa, primarily Hereros (a Bantu people from west of Lake Tangan-
yika), Namas (often called Hottentots), the Berg-Damara (also called
Damaras and Bergdamas, a people of unknown origin), the Ovambo
(supposed to have migrated from the Central African lake district), and
the Bushmen (descendants of the region's earliest inhabitants, these
small, yellow-skinned people who speak a unique "click" language are
believed to be in danger of extinction within the next few decades). ° In
addition, there are about 25,000 "coloreds" (persons of mixed descent),"
including the Rehoboth "Bastards," a unique community with strong
traditions, 2 and 73,000 whites, mostly of German and South African
origin.1" The white population lives in the so-called Police Zone, which
comprises about fifty-eight per cent of occupied South West Africa, in-
cluding the diamond areas."4 Africans who are not laborers in white
enterprises must reside outside the Zone or in closed "native reserves"
within the Zone. 5
History: Creation of the South West Africa Mandate
For the purpose of understanding the South West Africa Cases,
history begins when Bismarck, stealing a march on the British, established
the Colony of German South West Africa just across the Orange River
from the British Cape Colony. While the Germans engaged in the murder-
ous business of "pacifying" the rebellious tribes in their own colony,
their British and Dutch neighbors to the south were involved in the
mutual slaughter of the Boer Wars. Subsequent attempts at reconciliation
led to the formation of the Union of South Africa, dominated financially
by the British, but politically by the Boers. When the First World War
10 First 25-41, 45-48, app. E. Population figures cited by the SWA Comm. 9 (A/2913)
(1955) suggest that the nonwhite population is increasing somewhat more rapidly than
the white population.
The Bushmen are being forced by the pressure of white (and other nonwhite) to expansion
ever further into the uninhabitable Kalahari Desert.
11 First app. E. Stamp, supra note 8, at 541 lists about 53,000 coloreds. This apparent
change or discrepancy probably reflects uncertainty in the classification of certain groups
of the population. Rehobothers, for example, are classifed as "natives" while resident in
South West Africa but as "coloreds" if in the Republic. On racial classification in the
Republic generally, see Landis, "South African Apartheid Legislation I," 71 Yale L.. 1,
4-16 (1961) (particularly 14-16 which refers to the Population Registration Act).
12 First 41-45.
23 Id. at 49-57, app. E.
14 International Status of South-West Africa, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 128 (advisory opinion)
[hereinafter cited SWA Status]; Statement of Representative of the Secretary-General on
SWA Status 18 [hereinafter cited Kerno]; SWA Comm. 11 (A/2913) (1955); First 49-57,
121-22, app. E.
't SWA Comm. 12 (A/2913) (1955); First 25, 121. The area outside the Police Zone is
in the form of an irregular inverted "U," the southernmost tips being some 300 miles from
the Angola border. The arms of the inverted U average some 50 miles across, while the
base is about 100 miles deep and includes the Caprivi Zipfel. The Police Zone, originally
established by the Germans, includes some three quarters of the total land area of South
West Africa, but there are some rather sizable "native reerves" within the zone.
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started, Afrikaner politicians reluctantly allied their country with their
former British enemy. But as early as 1915 they reaped the first benefits
of this policy: they captured and occupied the enemy territory of South
West Africa.'
During the war secret agreements were reached among some of the
Allies that claims to occupied German territories would be recognized
upon victory, and in 1917 the Imperial War Cabinet agreed to the an-
nexation of South West Africa by the Union.' Unfortunately for South
Africa, as well as for Australia and New Zealand, which were eyeing
German South Pacific islands as their rightful spoils, President Wilson
was opposed to annexation of former enemy territories; he wanted the
international community to take responsibility for them, although practi-
cal administration might be delegated to an individual state acting as
agent or mandatory.8 In the winter following the Armistice the victorious
Council of Ten resolved these differences by the creation, in Article 22
of the Covenant of the League of Nations, of the mandates system, under
which ex-enemy territories would be governed by individual states acting
as mandatories, responsible therefor to the League.' 9
Article 22 opened with two paragraphs stating the ideals of the new
system:
(1) To [ex-German and ex-Turkish colonies] . . . which ... are inhab-
ited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous
conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that
the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of
civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be
embodied in this Covenant.
(2) The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the
tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who
: * . can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept
it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on
behalf of the League.
The colonies ("mandates" or "mandated territories") were then divided
into three groups on the basis of the stage of development of the people,
their geographical situation, and their economic conditions.2 0 In the
"A" group were the ex-Turkish colonies of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Trans-
16 SWA Cases 592; First 61-93; Stamp, supra note 8, at 488. For a history of South
Africa, see Lewin, Politics and Law in South Africa (1963) (a series of interpretative essays
relating to race relations in their historical and modem settings); Marquard, The Peoples
and Policies of South Africa ch. 1 (3d ed. 1962); Walker, A History of Southern Africa
(3d ed. 1957).
17 SWA Cases 592 (van Wyk, J., dissenting).
18 Ibid.
19 Id. at 592, 608-09. The Covenant is set out in full, id. at 593-94 (van Wyk, J., dissent-
ing).20 Covenant, art. 22, ff 3.
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jordan, and Palestine, which were sufficiently advanced to be "pro-
visionally recognized" as independent, "subject to the rendering of
administrative advice and assistance . . . until . . . they are able
to stand alone."'" Their wishes were to be weighed in selecting the
mandatory.2 2 Germany's former central African colonies (Tanganyika,
Ruanda-Urundi, the Cameroons, and Togoland) comprised the "B"
group.2 3 The stage of development of these colonies required the manda-
tories to:
[B]e responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions
which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion... the prohibition
of abuses such as the slave trade . . . and will also secure equal opportu-
nities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League.24
The "C" mandates included South West Africa, New Guinea, Nauru,
Western Samoa, and the North Pacific Islands.25 According to Paragraph
(6) of Article 22:
[O]wing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their
remoteness from the centres of civilisation, or their geographical contigu-
ity to the territory of the Mandatory [they could] ... be best administered
under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory,
subject to . . . safeguards ... in the interests of the indigenous population.
Paragraph (7) required every mandatory to make an annual report
to the Council of the League of Nations on each mandate committed to
it. Paragraph (9) provided for the establishment of a commission to
examine the annual reports of the mandatories and advise the Council
concerning the mandates; this became the Permanent Mandates Com-
mission. Finally, Paragraph (8) provided that:
The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the
Mandatory shall, if not previously [i.e., before the effective date of the
Covenant] agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly
defined in each case by the Council.
In May 1919, before the Treaty of Versailles was signed and the
League came into existence, the Big Four 6 agreed to allot the former
21 Covenant, art. 22, ff 4. The designations "A," "B," and "C" are not found in Article
22 but were used throughout the history of the League. SWA Cases 479 (Spender and
Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting).
22 Covenant, art. 22, ff 4.
23 Covenant, art. 22, f1 5.
24 Ibid.
25 Covenant, art. 22, ff 6.
26 The United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy. The United States eventually
withdrew from participation after President Wilson's domestic political defeat, and Japan
was admitted to the "inner circle." Technically, the term "Principal Allied and Associated
Powers" included the United States, and other terminology should be used to refer to the
victors excluding the United States. In the SWA Cases, however, the presence or absence of
the United States was not a relevant consideration; therefore this article does not attempt
any rigorous distinctions between the various groupings of victorious "Allies."
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enemy territories, as mandates, to the countries which occupied them;
South Africa, on whose behalf action was taken by "His Britannic
Majesty," eagerly accepted.2 7 At the end of June, Germany signed the
Treaty of Versailles, thereby formally ceding its colonies to the Allies.28
During the summer of 1919 drafts of proposed mandate agreements
were considered by a committee of the Great Powers. An American draft
first proposed that any dispute "between the Members of the League of
Nations relating to the interpretation or application of" the mandate
agreement should, if it could not be resolved by negotiation, be referred
to the Permanent Court of International Justice; the same draft would
also have permitted citizens of League members to go to the court for
redress of violations of the rights guaranteed to them under the agree-
ment.29 The latter proposal was amended to deny individuals access
to the court but to permit a member state to take up such a case on be-
half of its national; the former was approved without reservation by the
committee and by the chief Allied representatives. 0 By the end of
December 1919, agreement had been reached by the Allies on all terms of
the "C" mandates except an "open door" provision relating to certain
islands allotted to Japan; the provision for reference of disputes to the
Permanent Court was not questioned.3
The Japanese reservation continued to hold up final agreement on the
'C" mandates when the Versailles Treaty, of which the League Covenant
-was part, came into effect (after rejection by the American Senate)
in January 1920.2 Finally, in December 1920, the proposed mandate
for South West Africa, recast in the form of a Council resolution rather
than a convention, was submitted to the Council of the League for
its approval." The experts of the League Secretariat added a fourth
preambular paragraph, indicating that the proposed mandate provisions
-were established by the Council acting in accordance with Article 22
of the Covenant. They also slightly modified Article 7 of the mandate,
which provided for reference of disputes to the Permanent Court, by
27 SWA Cases 350 (separate opinion of Bustamante, 3.), 387 (separate opinion of Jessup,
J.).
28 Id. at 349 (separate opinion of Bustamante, 3.).
29 Id. at 387 (separate opinion of Jessup, J.), 393-94, 485 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, 33.,
dissenting), 554.
30 Id. at 388-89 (separate opinion of Jessup, J.), 555-58 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, 33.,
dissenting).
31 Id. at 389-90 (separate opinion of Jessup, J.).
32 Id. at 390 (separate opinion of Jessup, J.). judges Spender and Fitzmaurice contended
that between the effective date of the Versailles Treaty and December 17, 1920, when the
mandate for South West Africa was adopted by the Council of the League, the Union
administered South West Africa as a mandate on a "quasi-anticipatory basis." Id. at 483.
s3 Id. at 393-94 (separate opinion of Jessup, J.), 485 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, 33.,
dissenting).
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rewording the crucial second paragraph so that only the mandatory
was liable to be taken before the court by another Member of the
League in the case of an unsettled dispute concerning the mandate. 4
The preamble of the mandate agreement (or "declaration")," as
adopted by the Council on December 17, 1920, recited that Germany
had renounced its rights in South West Africa to the Allies; that the
Allies had "in accordance with Article 22 [of the] . . . Covenant"
agreed that the mandate should be conferred on His Britannic Majesty
"to be exercised on his behalf by the Government of the Union of South
Africa"; that the Union "had agreed to accept the Mandate [and] ...
to exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations in accordance with the
following" provisions"; and that the Council was empowered by Article
22 to define the terms of the mandate, wherefore, the Council, "Con-
firming the said Mandate, defines its terms as follows ... "
After an article defining the territory subject to the mandate,36 Article
2 spelled out in general terms the Union's authority and obligations:
The Mandatory shall have full power of administration and legislation
over the territory subject to the present Mandate as an integral portion of
the Union of South Africa, and may apply the laws of the Union of South
Africa to the territory, subject to such local modifications as circumstances
may require.
The Mandatory shall promote to the utmost the material and moral well-
being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory subject to
the present Mandate.
The three following articles elaborated on the then current concepts of
moral well-being and social progress by prohibiting slave trade, forced
labor, arms traffic, and the supply of intoxicating beverages to the
Africans and by forbidding military training of Africans or the establish-
ment of military bases or fortifications in the territory; positively, the
mandatory was required to ensure freedom of religion and to permit
missionaries nationals of any League member to enter and travel freely
in the area in the prosecution of their calling.
The last two articles provided assurances for the proper conduct of
the mandatory. Article 6 required annual reports "to the satisfaction of
the Council." The first paragraph of Article 7 required the consent of
the Council "for any modification of the terms of the present Mandate."
But it was the second paragraph which provided the means for the cur-
rent attack upon South Africa's stewardship:
34 Id. at 394, 396-97 (separate opinion of Jessup, J.), 453 (Winiarski, President, dis-
senting).85 The South West Africa mandate is set out in full in the dissenting opinions of Judges
Spender and Fitzmaurice (id. at 487-88) and of Judge van Wyk (id. at 594-96).
As to various uses of the word "mandate," see note 114 infra.
36 Mandate, art. 1.
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The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise
between the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations
relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the
Mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be sub-
mitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by
Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
The final paragraph of Article 7 provided for deposit of the declaration
in the League's archives and for the forwarding of certified copies to all
nations which signed the peace treaty with Germany.
In the twenty years that followed, Union administration of South West
Africa was severely questioned several times in the Permanent Mandates
Commission." But since the Council of the League (composed of repre-
sentatives of the Principal Allies as permanent members and representa-
tives of nine other countries elected by the Assembly for short terms,38
with the Union's representative joining when his country's interests were
at issue)39 acted only by unanimous agreement,4" the Union did not suffer
any serious censure. The Union gave up annual reporting when the Second
World War paralyzed the League.
41
-End of the League: Trusteeship (?)
At the close of the War the moribund League was not revitalized.
Instead, the San Francisco conference of 1945 created a new organi-
zation, the United Nations, which would, it was hoped, succeed (and be
ratified by the American Senate) where the League had failed. It did
away with the unanimity rule of the League: the U.N. General Assembly
votes by either a simple or by a two-thirds majority, depending on the
issue; 42 the Security Council requires only seven of eleven votes for ac-
tion, with a right of veto accorded each of the five permanent members. a
The U.N. Charter did not provide for continuation of the mandates.
37 Kerno 39-51; First 169-74.
38 Covenant, art. 4, ff 1, as amended, Sept. 25, 1922, and Sept. 8, 1926; Academie
Diplomatique Internationale, 2 Dictionnaire Diplomatique 761 & nn. a-c.
39 Covenant, art. 4, J 5.
40 Covenant, art. 5, II 1.
41 SWA Cases 631, 633 (van Wyk, J., dissenting).
42 Charter, art. 18, I1 f 2-3. Under the second paragraph, "important questions," which
shall be decided by a two-thirds vote, include:
[R]ecommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security,
the election of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, the election of
the members of the Economic and Social Council, the election of members of the
Trusteeship Council . .. the admission of new Members to the United Nations, the
suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, the expulsion of Members,
questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system, and budgetary questions.
Paragraph (3) provides that decision of "other questions, including the determination of
additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority," shall be by
a simple majority of the members present and voting.
43 Charter, art. 27, ff 3. Paragraph (2) requires a simple affirmative vote of seven members
on "procedural matters." In certain cases a party to a dispute is not entitled to vote.
Charter, art. 27, ff 3.
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In their place, however, Article 76"' established a very similar system
of trusteeship "to promote the political, economic, social, and educational
advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progres-
sive development towards self-government or independence .
According to Article 77 the system was designed to apply, inter alia, to
"territories now held under mandate" and to territories taken from the
losers in the Second World War. "It will be a matter for subsequent
agreement as to which territories in the foregoing categories will be
brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms."45 A saving
clause was added by Article 80(1), that:
[U]ntil such [trusteeship] agreements have been concluded, nothing in
this Chapter [on trusteeship] shall be construed in or of itself to alter in
any manner the rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms
of existing international instruments to which Members of the United
Nations may respectively be parties.
During the San Francisco conference the South African delegate had
advised his confreres that his government felt that the South West
Africa mandate should be terminated and the territory incorporated in
the Union.46 At the first session of the U.N. General Assembly the
South African representative in the Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee
stated the Union's position that the Charter did not require that mandates
be put under trusteeship; and he reiterated his government's desire to
end its mandate, in view of the advanced self-government enjoyed by
South West Africa and of a resolution by the territorial legislature
asking to join the Union 7 He added that approval of both whites and
nonwhites would be sought before any agreements were drawn and that
his government's decision "could be submitted to the General Assembly
for judgment." '48
A little later, in April 1946, members of the League met to dissolve
their organization. In the closing sessions representatives of the manda-
tories delivered their valedictories. The Union representative, after an-
nouncing that his government would press in the next U.N. General
Assembly session for incorporation of South West Africa, continued:
In the meantime, the Union will continue to administer the territory
44 The trusteeship system is created by Chapter XII, containing Articles 75-85. Chapter
XIII (Articles 86-91) establishes and defines the powers and duties of the Trusteeship
Council, the chief organ for administering the trusteeship system. For some differences be-
tween the trusteeship system and the mandates system, see text accompanying notes 50-56,
197-203, 211-15 infra.
45 Charter, art. 77, f 2.46 SWA Cases 533 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting), 537 (Spender and Fitz-
maurice, JJ., dissenting), 616-18 (van Wyk, J., dissenting); Kerno 66.
47 SWA Cases 538 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting), 623 (van Wyk, J., dis-
senting), 624 (van Wyk, J., dissenting).
48 Id. at 624.
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scrupulously in accordance with the obligations of the Mandate, for the
advancement and promotion of the interests of the inhabitants, as she has
done during the past six years when meetings of the Mandates Commission
could not be held.
The disappearance of those organs of the League concerned with the su-
pervision of mandates . . . will necessarily preclude complete compliance
with the letter of the Mandate. The Union Government will nevertheless
regard the dissolution of the League as in no way diminishing its obligations
under the Mandate, which it will continue to discharge with the full and
proper appreciation of its responsibilities until . . other arrangements are
agreed upon concerning the future status of the territory.49
One of the final resolutions of the League Assembly, before its dis-
solution that spring, took note of:
[T]he expressed intentions of the Members of the League now admin-
istering territories under mandate to continue to administer them for the
well-being and development of the peoples concerned in accordance with
the obligations contained in the respective Mandates, until other arrange-
ments have been agreed between the United Nations and the respective
mandatory Powers.50
And within a relatively short time all the mandated territories except
South West Africa either became independent or were brought under
the trusteeship system.51
The Union, however, took an increasingly intransigent position in
the face of not merely the General Assembly's refusal to permit annexa-
tion, but also growing criticism by the Trusteeship Council of the con-
ditions of nonwhites in South West Africa.52 (The Council served much
the same function as the League's Permanent Mandates Commission,
but it was composed of representatives of U.N. members rather than
technical experts of the Secretariat. 3 ) In 1949, the Nationalist govern-
ment stopped the reports on South West Africa which had previously
been sent (as a courtesy and not out of any sense of legal obligation, it
was asserted) to the Trusteeship Council.54 At about the same time it was
announced that the Union had revamped the territorial legislature and
provided for representation of South West Africa in the South African
Parliament 5 5 -annexation in fact, if not in legal form, it was charged in
the General Assembly.5 6 The Assembly's Fourth Committee thereupon
49 Id. at 339-40 (opinion of the court), 417-18 (separate opinion of Jessup, J.), 628-29
(van Wyk, J., dissenting).
50 Id. at 340 (opinion of the court), 418 (separate opinion of Jessup, J.), 538 n.1 (Spender
and Fitzmaurice, j., dissenting), 627 (van Wyk, J., dissenting); Kerno 5-6, 8-10.
51 Id. at 5-6, 10, 79 & n.1, 80. The future of Palestine was determined only after several
years of wrangling at the U.N. and bloodshed on the spot.
52 Id. at 17-18, 21.
53 Charter, arts. 86-87.
54 Kerno 21-22.
55 Id. at 22. South West Africa is represented by six seats in the House of the Assembly.
56 Kerno 19-20.
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took the then extraordinary step of granting an oral hearing to the
Reverend Michael Scott, an Anglican clergyman accredited by the
Herero chiefs, who was the only available first-hand witness on conditions
in the territory; and the Union delegate walked out of committee hear-
ings on South West Africa."
Disturbed by the accumulating evidence before it and frustrated by
the Union's attitude and actions, the General Assembly resolved to re-
quest an advisory opinion from the International Court on the legal
status of South West Africa.58 Thus the curtain rose on the legal drama
of South West Africa in the International Court.
ACT I-THE ADVISORY OPINIONS
The request for an advisory opinion, filed at the end of 1949, posed
a series of specific questions, all, in effect, varied aspects of the key
question concerning the exact legal status of South West Africa. 59 The
following July the court handed down a four part opinion:60 on the
general question of the territory's status, it held unanimously that
"South-West Africa was a territory under the international Mandate
assumed by the Union of South Africa on December 17th, 1920 .... ,61
By a vote of twelve-two the court went on to say:
[T]he Union . . . continues to have the international obligations stated
in Article 22 of the Covenant... and in the Mandate... as well as the
obligation to transmit petitions . . .the supervisory functions to be exer-
cised by the United Nations, to which the annual reports and the petitions
are to be submitted, and the reference to the Permanent Court .. .to
be replaced by a reference to the International Court of Justice.62
Thirdly, all the judges agreed that the trusteeship provisions of the
Charter were available for South West Africa,63 but by eight-six the
court held that these provisions "do not impose on the Union of South
57 Id. at 24-25. About half of Scott's autobiography, A Time to Speak (1958), is de-
voted to South Africa and South West Africa and Scott's lonely struggle in the U.N. on
behalf of the nonwhites of these areas.
58 Kerno 25-28.
59 What is the international status of .. .South West Africa and what are the inter-
national obligations of the Union of South Africa arising therefrom, in particular:
(a) Does the Union . . . continue to have international obligations under the Man-
date ... and, if so, what are those obligations?
(b) Are the provisions of Chapter XII of the Charter applicable and, if so, in what
manner, to ...South West Africa?
(c) Has the Union . . . competence to modify the international status of ...South
West Africa, or, in the event of a negative reply, where does competence rest ..
SWA Status 129.
60 SWA Status. For comments on the decision, see Lauterpacht, The Development of
International Law by the International Court 181-82, 291-92 (1958); Hudson, "The
Twenty-Ninth Year of the World Court," 1 Amer. J. Int. L. 11-19 (1951).
61 SWA Status 143.
62 Ibid.
63 Id. at 144.
1964]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
Africa a legal obligation to place the Territory under the Trusteeship
System . . . 2 4 Finally, and again unanimously, the court held that the
Union was not competent unilaterally to modify the "international sta-
tus" of South West Africa, but that such competence "rest[ed] with the
Union of South Africa, acting with the consent of the United Nations."65
Five judges wrote separate opinions concurring in part and dissenting in
part.6
Although members of the Assembly had hoped that the court's
pronouncement would clarify the problem for the doubtful and thereby
help bring about an agreement on South West Africa, no such result
followed. Negotiations between an ad hoc committee of the Assembly
and representatives of the Union were fruitless.6 7 (During this period the
new Boer-dominated government was intensifying every facet of segrega-
tion within the Union and beginning a campaign to suppress all opposition
to its policies.6 8) In 1953 the Assembly established a Committee on South
West Africa to exercise, in relation to that territory only, the functions
formerly performed by the Permanent Mandates Commission (examining
information, reports, and petitions, reporting to the Assembly on condi-
tions in the territory, and preparing for the Assembly's consideration
procedures for its examination of reports and petitions), using procedures
as far as possible analogous to those of the Commission.6 9
An issue arose as to the propriety of a proposed rule of procedure gov-
erning General Assembly decisions on the way in which reports and
petitions were to be made.7 0 The proposal was that the Assembly should
follow the procedure set out in Article 18(2) of the Charter, requiring
a two-thirds majority.71 But a passage in the 1950 advisory opinion, which
summarized the court's conclusions on the obligations of the Union,
stated:
The degree of supervision to be exercised by the General Assembly [in
regard to the South West Africa mandate] should not . . . exceed that
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Id. at 146 (separate opinion of McNair, J.), 164 (separate opinion of Read, J),
174 (Alvarez, J., dissenting), 186 (de Visscher, J., dissenting), 191 (Krylov, J., dissenting).
67 SWA Comm. 7-11 (A/1901) (1952); see id. at (A/2066), id. at Corr. 1.
68 The Nationalist Party came to power in 1948. For a detailed study of South African
politics of the period, see Carter, The Politics of Inequality (rev. ed. 1959) (especially chs.
1-4). For an analysis of the legal techniques of suppressing the opposition, see Landis, "South
African Apartheid Legislation II," 71 Yale L.J. 437, 467-99 (1962).
69 South-West Africa-Voting Procedure, [1955] I.C.J. Rep. 67, 71 (advisory opinion)
[hereinafter cited SWA Voting]; Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Comm.
on South West Africa, [1956] I.C.J. Rep. 23, 25 (advisory opinion) [hereinafter cited
SWA Petitioners].
70 This question was raised by representatives of the Union in the General Assembly and
its committees. SWA Voting 74.
71 See note 42 supra.
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which applied under the Mandates System, and should conform as far
as possible to the procedure followed in -this respect by the Council of the
League .... 72
And in the Council of the League decisions had to be unanimous.7 The
General Assembly therefore asked the court to pass on its voting pro-
cedure, and, if it was not proper, to inform it what procedure should
be followed. 74
Holding that the Assembly receives its competence from the Charter
and that it is within the Charter that the Assembly must find the rules
governing its procedure, the court unanimously held the proposed rule
appropriate:
It would be legally impossible for the General Assembly, on the one
hand, to rely on the Charter in receiving and examining reports and peti-
tions concerning South-West Africa, and, on the other hand, to reach
decisions relating to these reports and petitions in accordance with a
voting system entirely alien to that prescribed by the Charter.75
The court stated that the "degree of supervision," which was not to
exceed that under the Mandates System, did not relate to the system of
voting, a procedural matter.78 And its first opinion had implicitly
recognized that procedures could not be entirely identical: "Conse-
quently, the expression 'as far as possible' was designed to allow for
adjustments and modifications necessitated by legal or practical con-
siderations.17
Within a year the General Assembly again sought the court's advice,
this time concerning the hearing of petitioners from the territory. During
the lifetime of the League, the Council had never granted permission to
the Permanent Mandates Commission to hear petitioners orally although
it had made clear that the power existed and might be granted in extraor-
dinary circumstances. 78 If a written petition was received directly from
an inhabitant, he was instructed to submit it to the mandatory power,
which would transmit it to the Commission with its comments. 79 When
72 SWA Status 138.
73 See text accompanying note 40 supra.
74 (a) Is the following Rule on the voting procedure to be followed by the General
Assembly a correct interpretation of the Advisory Opinion. . . of 11 July 1950:
"Decisions of the General Assembly on questions relating to reports and petitions
concerning . . . South West Africa shall be regarded as important questions within
the meaning of Article 18, paragraph 2, of the Charter... ?"
(b) If this interpretation . . . is not correct, what voting procedure should be
followed . . ?
SWA Voting 75.
75 SWA Voting 76.
76 Id. at 74.
77 Id. at 77.
78 SWA Petitioners 28-29. But Commission members did have "private" interviews with
petitioners on occasion. Id. at 42 (separate opinion of Lauterpacht, J.).
79 Id. at 50.
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South Africa refused to cooperate further with the U.N. after the War,
the Committee on South West Africa had to devise an alternative pro-
cedure since the Union would no longer forward petitions. It directed
petitioners to send their petitions to the South African government; but if
the government failed to transmit them within two months, the Committee
considered the originals validly received, studied them, and made such
reports thereon as seemed appropriate on the basis of its own growing
documentation and expertise.80 However, with the first appearance of
South West Africans in New York asking to be heard in person, the
question became whether the Assembly might sanction such a departure
from League practice-again in view of the passage in the 1950 opinion
that U.N. supervision should not exceed that exercised by the League
and that the same procedures should-be followed as far as possible."'
By a vote of eight-five the court held that the Committee might
properly grant oral hearings to petitioners.82 Despite the abstract form
of the question framed by the Assembly,88 the judges clearly were
influenced by the "practical considerations arising out of the lack of
co-operation by the Mandatory. ' 84 Indeed, in one passage the court stated
that, in view of the Union's failure to comment on petitions, oral hearings
would make it possible for the Committee better to judge the merits of
the petitions-and it certainly could not increase the burden of the
mandatory to have the petitions subject to the most searching scrutiny
before report thereon was made to the Assembly! 8 In a concurring
opinion Sir Hersch Lauterpacht scouted the validity of this argument;8
but he, too, reacted strongly to the anomalous legal situation in which
South Africa refused to act on an Advisory Opinion which it was not
legally bound to follow, but which formed the basis for subsequent pro-
test against the granting of oral hearings.87
The most immediate and, probably, unexpected consequence of the
1956 opinion was to open Committee hearings to a flood of South West
African "refugees," who suddenly began to flee their homeland in de-
fiance of the most stringent Union regulations. The Reverend Michael
Scott, who for years had singlehandedly carried the burden of petitions
and lobbying at the U.N., was joined first by a handful, then by scores, of
80 Id. at 31 (opinion of the court), 50-51 (separate opinion of Lauterpacht, J.).
81 SWA Status 138.
82 SWA Petitioners 32.
83 Id. at 24: "Is it consistent with the advisory opinion of . .. 11 July 1950 for the
Committee on South West Africa . . . to grant oral hearings to petitioners on matters
relating to the Territory of South West Africa?"
84 SWA Petitioners 31.
85 Id. at 30.
86 Id. at 41 (separate opinion of Lauterpacht, J.).
87 Id. at 47.
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Africans, many with personal tragedy to relate, all with tribal oppression
to protest and document.88 But the increasingly aroused Assembly could
not move the Union to change its policy in South West Africa, and
repeated attempts of ad hoc committees to find some acceptable solution
came to naught .8  The time had come for some new and drastic ap-
proach to the problem.
ACT II-CONTENTIOUS PROCEEDINGS
For years a handful of interested persons had been intrigued by the
possibilities of Article 7(2) of the mandate, the so-called "compulsory
jurisdiction clause,"'90 by which the Union had "agreed" that unresolved
disputes with any League member concerning the mandate should be
submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice. Although
neither the League nor the Permanent Court still existed, it was felt that
the International Court of Justice had succeeded, by virtue of Article 37
of its statute,91 to the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court under the man-
date. Under this theory it only remained to find, from among the countries
which so vehemently protested conditions in South West Africa, a former
member of the League willing to undertake such a proceeding before the
international tribunal. In practice only Ethiopia and Liberia seemed
legally qualified and willing to proceed; a nice legal question arose
whether other independent African States, former colonies of Britain and
France, both League members, had succeeded to the status of the mother
countries, but it seemed that argument on such a tenuous point might
distract the court from the substantive issues.92 Finally in 1959 the Gen-
eral Assembly, acting on a special report on legal action available to
enforce mandate obligations against South Africa,93 "invited" legally
qualified states to proceed against the Union in the International Court.9"
Late in 1960 representatives of Ethiopia and Liberia filed their com-
plaints ("applications") with the court.
88 Among the earliest: Mburumba Kerina; Jariretundu Kozonguizi; Hans Beukes
(whose dramatic escape is chronicled in Lowenstein, Brutal Mandate ch. III (1962));
Rev. Markus Kooper; Sam Nujoma; Ismail Fortune; Jacob Kuhangua.
89 These attempts are recited in the annual reports of the South West Africa Committee.
See, e.g., 1962 (A/5212) ; 1960 (A/4464) annex 11; 1955 (A/2913) ; 1953 (A/2261, A/2475);
1951-1952 (A/1901).
90 Also called the "compromissory clause" or "adjudication clause." Quoted in text
prior to note 37 supra.
91 Quoted in text at note 108 infra.
92 Conversations With African Representatives at the U.N.
93 U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 12th Sess., SWA Comm. Special Report, Supp. No. 12A
(A/3625) (1957).
94 U.N. Gen. Ass. Res. 1361, 14th Sess. (17 Nov. 1959). Its key provision drew:
[T]he attention of Member States to the conclusions of the special report of the
Committee on South West Africa covering the legal action open to Member States
to refer any dispute with the Union of South Africa concerning the . . . Mandate . . .
to the International Court . . . in accordance with Article 7 of the Mandate read in
conjunction with Article 37 of the Statute of the Court.
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Complaint and Answer
The "submissions" of the two applicants asked the court, first, sub-
stantially to confirm its 1950 opinion by finding that South West Africa
is a territory under mandate, that the mandate is a treaty within the
meaning of Article 37 of the court's statute, that South Africa remains
subject to the obligations set forth in Article 22 of the Covenant of the
League and in the mandate, and that the U.N. is legally qualified to
exercise the supervisory functions of the League in relation to the ad-
ministration of the mandated territory." Further, the court was asked to
find that the Union had violated its obligations, both general and specific,
by, inter alia, failing generally to promote the material and moral well-
being and social progress of the inhabitants of the territory; by intro-
ducing the doctrine and practice of apartheid (racial discrimination) in
South West Africa; by substantially modifying the terms of the mandate
without the consent of the U.N.; by refusing to render reports and trans-
mit petitions to the U.N.; and by establishing military bases in the man-
date. 6
The response of the South African government was directed to the
jurisdiction of the court, not to the merits of the case. It alleged that the
governments of Ethiopia and Liberia had no locus standi in the proceed-
ings and the court no jurisdiction because:
Firstly, by reason of the dissolution of the League of Nations, the
Mandate for South West Africa is no longer a "treaty or convention in
force" within the meaning of Article 37 of the Statute of the Court . . .
(a) with respect to the said Mandate Agreement as a whole . . .
(b) in any event, with respect to Article 7 itself;
Secondly, neither . . . Government . . . is "another Member of the
League of Nations", as required . . . by Article 7 . . .
Thirdly, the conflict or disagreement alleged by... Ethiopia and Liberia
to exist between them and ... the Republic of South Africa, is by reason
of its nature and content not a "dispute" as envisaged in Article 7 of the
Mandate... more particularly in that no material interests of ... Ethiopia
and/or Liberia or of their nationals are involved therein or affected there-
by;
Fourthly, the alleged conflict or disagreement is as regards its state of
development not a "dispute" which "cannot be settled by negotiation"
within the meaning of Article 7 .... [Emphasis by the court.]97
(As a result of questions put to the parties by the judges, the first prelim-
inary objection was amended to read that the mandate "has never been,
95 SWA Cases 322. These requests are from paragraphs "A" and "B" of the applications.
They are repeated in substantially equivalent form in paragraphs (1)-(2) of the applicants'
memorials, quoted id. at 324.
96 Id. at 323-25 (taken from the applications and memorials set out verbatim in the
court's opinion).
97 Id. at 326-27 quoting the oral submissions of the government of South Africa.
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or at any rate is since the dissolution of the League ...no longer, a
'treaty or convention in force ... 8. I'l Otherwise, argument was based
on the objections as originally stated.99)
In accordance with its rules, the court suspended consideration of the
merits of the complaint in order first to determine the jurisdictional
issue.10
Preliminary Analysis
Decision of the Preliminary Objections caused the court all the anguish
which jurisdictional cases are likely to occasion.
Despite the disclaimers of the judges,' 0 ' the spectre of South West
Africa seemed to haunt the court, whether in the form of oppressed inter-
national orphans or of international busybodies prying into the private
affairs of sovereign states. By alleging prima facie jurisdiction in the
court, Ethiopia and Liberia had forced South Africa to take the generally
unpopular position that the court was not competent to hear substantive
issues charged with burning emotions. The disapproval of nearly the entire
U.N. was so intense that the dissenting judges felt obliged to remind
their more tenderminded brethren:
[T] he fact that, in present circumstances ... technical or political control
cannot in practice be exercised in respect of the Mandate ...is not a
ground for asking a Court of law to discharge a task which, in the final
analysis, hardly appears to be a judicial one.' 02
More important, perhaps, to the dissenters was the burden of proof.
The dissenters argued that it was the duty of the applicants to establish
the jurisdiction of the court beyond any reasonable doubt; 0 3 instead of
insisting that the plaintiffs meet and overcome this burden, the dissen-
ters protested that the form of the applications and of the objections, as
well as the court's initial approach, had strongly influenced the out-
come: °4 "The Court has, in our opinion, only been able [to reject re-
spondent's objections] ... by adopting premises which.., largely assume
beforehand the correctness of the conclusions arrived at." 05 The wording
of the court's opinion did, indeed, seem to present the objections of the
respondent more or less neutrally, as points to be proved or disproved,
rather than as barriers to be surmounted.
98 Id. at 327. Italics indicate the substantive changes in the submissions.
99 Id. at 328.
100 Id. at 322.
101 Id. at 437 (separate opinion of Mbanefo, J.), 459-60 (Basdevant, J., dissenting),
466-67 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting).
102 Id. at 467 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting).
103 Id. at 348 (opinion of the court), 473-74 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting).
104 Id. at 460 (Basdevant, J., dissenting).
105 Id. at 465 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting).
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In form the, court's opinion followed the fourfold pattern of respond-
ent's objections. So, to a considerable extent, did the longer opinions of
the concurring judges. But by their very nature they presented alternative
or even conflicting arguments supporting the court's conclusions. By
contrast, the various dissenting judges tended to place their major empha-
sis on varying objections, so that their arguments seemed to be more
generally complementary. Since, however, in all opinions arguments
directed to one point often applied as well to others, it has frequently
been necessary to disregard the rubrics and formal subdivisions created
by the judges in order to relate their rationale to the point in issue.
In analyzing the opinions for this article, it is assumed that the four
objections state only two fundamental jurisdictional issues: (1) is there
any basis at all for bringing South Africa before the court (the substance
of the first objection); and (2) if so, do the applicants meet the require-
ments for proceeding on such a basis (to which issue the other three
objections are directed)?
(1) Basis for Bringing South Africa Before the Court
Dissenting Judges Spender and Fitzmaurice stressed repeatedly the
fundamental principle that the Republic of South Africa, as a sovereign
state, could be brought before the court only by its consent. °6 Since that
consent obviously was not forthcoming at the time the proceedings were
instituted, the applicants had the primary burden of establishing that
consent had once been given and that it had not lapsed or been with-
drawn. In substance their theory was: (a) that such consent had been
given by Article 7 of the mandate, which was an international treaty;
(b) that such mandate and article remained in force; and (c) that the
International Court had jurisdiction to hear the proceedings brought
under Article 7 by virtue of reading together Article 36(1) of the statute
of the court, which defined its competence to extend to "treaties and
conventions in force,"M0 7 and Article 37 of the statute, which provided:
Whenever a treaty or a convention in force provides for reference of a
matter to ... the Permanent Court of International Justice, the matter
shall, as between the parties to the present Statute, be referred to the
International Court of Justice.10
The respondent contended that Article 37 did not grant jurisdiction
to the court, but merely substituted:
106 Id. at 467, 473-74, 501-02, 545.
107 Stat. Int'l Ct. Just. art. 36 reads: "The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases
which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in [the Charter of the
United Nations or] treaties and conventions in force."
108 Ethiopia, Liberia; and South Africa are all parties to the statute of the court under
Charter, art. 93, It 1 which reads: "All Members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties
to the Statute of the International Court . .. ."
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[T]he present Court for the former Permanent Court in all cases in which
under a "treaty or convention in force", the Permanent Court would have
had jurisdiction and would have been competent to hear and determine
the case.' 09 [Emphasis by the court.]
This being so, it claimed that there was no basis for its being brought
before the court since: (a) the mandate never was a treaty; and (b) if
the mandate had ever been a treaty, that treaty and all its obligations
had been terminated finally and absolutely upon dissolution of the
League.
Because Article 7 was the key provision of the mandate, both parties
had to argue, at least as a subsidiary issue, whether it could or should be
treated separately from the other provisions of the mandate. To the ap-
plicants it could be considered on its own as a valid treaty even if the
mandate as a whole were not deemed in force; to the respondent it con-
stituted a sort of "bastard accretion,"" 0 an anomaly not to be held part
of the basic treaty (if such the mandate was). (Respondent's additional
argument, that in any case the article didn't mean what the applicants
claimed it did, was directed primarily to the second jurisdictional issue:
whether applicants met the requirements to bring a proceeding under
its provisions.) Arguments referring to the "mandate" often were in fact
primarily concerned with Article 7. In this analysis it does not seem gen-
erally worthwhile to distinguish between arguments referring to the man-
date as a whole and those directed to Article 7 except when the judges
themselves made that distinction.
The Mandate Never Was a Treaty. It appears from the record that
the respondent did not place much emphasis on the contention that the
mandate never was a treaty."' But the dissenting Commonwealth
judges," 2 though considering the third objection basic," 8 elaborated at
length on the amended first objection.
109 SWA Cases 469 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting).
110 Id. at 373 (Judge Bustamante's characterization of the South African characterization
of the article).
"'1 The court quotes the respondent as follows:
[T]he alternative view might well be taken that in defining the terms of the Mandate,
the Council was taking executive action . . .and was not entering into an agreement
which would itself be a treaty .... This view, we put it no higher than a view that
might be taken ....
Id. at 330 (opinion of the court).
112 South Africa left the Commonwealth upon becoming a republic. The Commonwealth
judges on the court included Spender (Australia) and Fitzmaurice (Great Britain), dissenting,
and Mbanefo (Chief justice, Eastern Region, Nigeria), ad hoc judge, concurring. Under
the court's procedure, the applicants were jointly entitled to name one ad hoc judge and the
respondent was entitled to choose one (van Wyk, justice of the Appellate Division of
the South African Supreme Court). Id. at 321-22.
113 Having regard to the view we take on the third Preliminary Objection ... much
of the discussion on the first preliminary objection (as also the second) has for us
a certain unreality, since these objections are hardly meaningful, and are in any event
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Their attack was on the "character" of the mandate," 4 which they
claimed was not that of a treaty, but of a "quasi-legislative act of the
League Council, carried out in the exercise of a power given to it by the
Covenant .... ,, 5 They started by pointing out that in form the South
West Africa Mandate does not look like a treaty and that it is called a
"declaration."" 6 They emphasized that the original draft of the mandate,
which had been in the form of a treaty, was deliberately recast as a res-
olution of the League Council. "[The mandate] was not intended to be
a treaty, or the original intention would have been proceeded with .... " 7
Indeed, in their view, the Council demonstrated that the mandate was its
own act rather than a treaty by modifying the draft presented to it by
the Principal Powers, inserting a fourth preambular paragraph and re-
wording Article 7.118 Further evidence was that the Council replaced the
proposed final clause of the preamble, reading "[The Council] Hereby
approves the terms of the Mandate as follows" by a new clause which
read "[The Council] confirming the said Mandate, defines its terms as
follows . . . ."9 The mere fact, the judges added severely, that the pre-
amble recited "certain antecedent consents" or that the mandate was
created under authority of the League Covenant, which was itself a
treaty, did not make the mandate a treaty. 2 ° Nor was the isolated phrase
"the Mandatory agrees" any more significant in determining the nature
of the whole document.' 2 '
Proceeding in their attack on the character of the mandate, the dis-
senters criticized the idea, attributed to the applicants and the court, that
"any instrument creating international obligations has treaty charac-
ter... "In brief, the assumption that it suffices if an international ob-
unnecessary, in the context of this case, if Article 7 does not relate to the conduct
of the Mandate ....
Id. at 473. (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting).
114 Judge Jessup pointed out in his opinion that "the word 'Mandate' has been used in
many different senses-to indicate an institution, an instrument, a treaty or agreement,
a grant of authority and a territory." Id. at 401 (separate opinion of Jessup, J.). Judges
Spender and Fitzmaurice clarified their position:
What we understand by the Mandate is not this piece of paper [deposited in the
archives of the League on 17 December 1920], but the international act that gave rise
to it, namely . . . the Resolution of the Council of the League of the same date.
[I]t is . . . essential to distinguish clearly between the Mandates System, and
the individual Mandates . . . . The former (the System) was the creation of Article
22 of the Covenant . . . . The latter, the Mandates themselves, were not.
Id. at 477-79 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting).
115 Id. at 490; accord, id. at 460 (Basdevant, J., dissenting).
116 Id. at 490, 499-500 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting).
117 Id. at 484. [Emphasis by the court.]
118 Id. at 489-90, 597 (van Wyk, J., dissenting).
119 Id. at 489 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting). [Emphasis added.]
120 Id. at 491.
121 Id. at 478.
122 Id. at 491.
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ligation exists, is to beg the whole question at issue, and to assume what
has to be demonstrated .... , 123 They noted that by contrast with Article
37 of the court statute, transferring jurisdiction in cases of a "treaty or
convention in force," Article 80(1) of the U.N. Charter, which saves
certain rights pending trusteeship, refers to rights arising out of "existing
international instruments."'24 This difference in phraseology, by legal
specialists who had a hand at both instruments, must have been signifi-
cant; the judges suggested that the quoted phrase in Article 80(1) prob-
ably was intended to refer specifically to mandates. 25 In the same vein
they noted that that part of an early Assembly resolution dealing with the
transfer from the League of certain political functions, including the
supervisory functions of the Council, was styled "'treaties, international
conventions, agreements and other instruments having a political char-
acter . . . . "'I Had like phraseology, they added, "been used in
Articles 36 and 37 [of the Court statute], no doubt would have existed
that the Mandate was covered, whatever view might be taken as to the
character of that act or instrument.' 27
The dissenting judges found still another stumbling block to holding
the mandate a treaty: a treaty requires two (or more) parties to it.'28 But
if the Union of South Africa was the "party of the first part" to a man-
date agreement, with whom could it be said to have contracted? Hardly
the League, for forty years ago it was assumed that such an international
organization had no legal personality apart from that of its members. 2 9
Not the Principal Powers, for: (a) the preamble to the mandate limited
their role to naming the mandatory and proposJng the terms of the man-
date; (b) this was inconsistent with the powers of the League Council
(in which the Principal Powers formed only a minority while the United
States was, of course, not represented at all') to supervise the manda-
tory and to modify the mandate; and (c) this was inconsistent with the
conduct of such states after World War II and with the court's 1950
opinion that the power to supervise the mandate now vested in the U.N.
General Assembly.3 ' Neither could it be said that the party of the second
part was the individual members for: (a) this was inconsistent with the
form of the mandate, the absence of separate signatures, ratifications,
etc.; (b) this was inconsistent with the Council's modification of Article
123 Id. at 477.
124 Emphasis added. Article 80(1) is quoted in text prior to note 46 supra.
125 SWA Cases 477 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting).
126 Id. at 478. [Emphasis by the court.]
127 Id. at 477.
128 Id. at 475-76.
129 Id. at 475 n.1.
130 Id. at 497; see text accompanying note 38 supra.
131 SWA Cases 496, 498-99 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting).
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7 to make South Africa only subject to the compulsory jurisdiction of
the Permanent Court in disputes affecting the mandate; and (c) evidence
shows that nonmembers of the Council were not consulted as to the super-
vision of the mandate and were bound by Council action only through
their membership in the League (as parties to the Covenant) and not as
parties to the mandate. 13 2 If the party of the second part was held to be
the members of the Council or of the League in their capacity as mem-
bers, or possibly the League itself, then their respective capacity or exist-
ence ceased upon the dissolution of the League; and with such disap-
pearance the alleged former treaty (lacking a second party) ceased to
exist.' 83
Furthermore it was argued that any engagements undertaken in the
mandate never were binding since the mandate had not been registered
in accordance with the procedure required by Article 18 of the Cove-
nant. 3 4 Moreover, the facts of nonregistration and of failure to have the
mandates published in the League's Treaty Series were claimed to be
evidence that the mandate was not considered a treaty. 35
But even if the mandate as a whole were held to be a treaty, the dis-
senting judges argued that Article 7 could not properly be considered
an integral part of such agreement.3 6 Unlike other clauses of the mandate,
132 Id. at 500-02; accord, id. at 594 (van Wyk, J., dissenting). Judges Spender and
Fitzmaurice also claimed that the members of the League could not individually have been
parties to the mandate because the fourth paragraph of the preamble recited that there was
no agreement among the members: "it is provided that the degree of authority, control
or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory not having been previously agreed
upon by the Members of the League, shall be explicitly defined by the Council ....
Id. at 500-01. judge Jessup aflswered that apparently the phrase "not having been pre-
viously agreed upon by the Members of the League" should have been set off by commas,
to make it conditional in sense, as in the French version ("il est pr~vu que si le d~grA
d'autorit6 . . . n'a pas fait lobjet d'une Convention antrieure entre les Membres de ]a
Socift&') and in the Covenant, art. 22, ff 8 which the disputed paragraph paraphrases.
Moreover, he added, the dissenting judges' interpretation was contrary both to the
historical facts and to the recital of facts in paragraphs 2-3 of the preamble. SWA Cases
394-95 (separate opinion of Jessup, J.).
133 Id. at 499 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting).
134 Id. at 332 (opinion of the court), 493-94 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting).
The key sentence of Article 18 provided: "No such [i.e., unregistered] treaty or inter-
national engagement shall be binding until so registered." The equivalent provision of the
Charter is found in Article 102:
(1) Every treaty and every international agreement entered into by any Member
of the United Nations . . . shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat
and published by it.
(2) No party to any such treaty or international agreement which has not been
[so] registered . . . may invoke that treaty or agreement before any organ of the
United Nations.
135 SWA Cases 494 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting).
136 Id. at 516-17, 640 (van Wyk, J., dissenting).
[T]here is in fact no principle of international law which requires that because an
instrument or institution survives or continues in existence, it must necessarily do so
with respect to all its parts on a completely non-severable basis. The position is quite
the contrary . . ..
Id. at 517 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting).
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Article 7 did not incorporate provisions already stated generally in Ar-
ticle 22 of the Covenant; instead, if interpreted as the applicants urged,
it created a wholly novel form of judicial supervision not contemplated
in the Covenant.131 Such an innovation was clearly ultra vires, for Article
22, para. 1 states that "securities for the performance of this trust [de-
velopment of the peoples of the mandate] should be embodied in this
Covenant"; and that, the judges concluded, obviously excluded other
alleged "securities" found elsewhere. 3 In support of their reasoning,
the judges pointed to the two key securities found in the Covenant:
annual reporting by the mandatories, and administrative supervision (ac-
cording to the dissenters, really "political" supervision: "the system...
was intended to be worked by a process of discussion, negotiation, and
of common understanding"'8 9 ) by the League Council and its Permanent
Mandates Commission. 40
Nor was there any basis in the law of contracts, the dissenting judges
added, for holding Article 7 in force on the grounds of "necessity." Neces-
sity implies that "the instrument, institution or system it relates to will
not function without it .... In general, provisions for adjudication have
not been regarded as having this character in relation to the instruments
they figure in."' 4 ' After all, most instruments do not have adjudication
clauses, including, they added, the trusteeship agreements of the U.N.142
Judge Winiarski pointed out that in all the years of the League the "judi-
cial security" of the mandates was used only once-to protect the com-
mercial rights of a Greek national in Palestine. 43 Judges Spender and
Fitzmaurice summed up their argument in two revealing paragraphs:
Looking at the matter ... in the light of its history .. .it seems ...
clear that the Applicants .. .are seeking to apply a sort of principle of
"hindsight" and . . . "subsequent necessity" quite unknown to inter-
national law. What has happened is that a provision . ..practically
never used . . .is seen (because of Article 94 of the Charter) to have
potentialities which it did not originally possess .... [I] t is only through
Article 7 that any control can be achieved over the Mandatory.
137 Id. at 452-53 (Winiarski, President, dissenting), 599-600 (van Wyk, J., dissenting),
607-08 (van Wyk, J., dissenting).138 Id. at 458 (Winiarski, President, dissenting), 480 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ.,
dissenting), 522 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, J., dissenting), 599-600 (van Wyk, J., dis-
senting), 661 (van Wyk, J., dissenting). [Emphasis added.]
139 Id. at 520 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting).
140 Id. at 480. The provisions that the mandate was to be exercised "on behalf of the
League" and that the "well-being and development" of its peoples formed "a sacred trust
of civilization" were also securities of a sort.
141 Id. at 519. [Emphasis by the court.]
142 Id. at 522, 524, 601 (van Wyk, J., dissenting).
143 Id. at 454 (Winiarski, President, dissenting). The exception involves the Mavrom-
matis Palestine Concessions, P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 5 (1925), No. 2 (1924). The Mavrom-
matis case is also referred to id. at 352-53 (separate opinion of Bustamante, 3.), 390-92
(separate opinion of Jessup, J.), 484-85 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, J3., dissenting).
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This . . . is not a valid legal argument.... Subsequent events may
affect the importance of a provision: they cannot affect its intrinsic legal
character . . . . [Emphasis by the court.] 144
The judges appended one more relatively legalistic note: Article 7
could not stand on its own as a separate treaty for detached from the
mandate as a whole it would be "meaningless" and could have "no real
existence."' 45 Moreover, in such form it would be merely a "unilateral
declaration involving a unilateral assumption of obligation, since the
Mandatory alone gave the undertaking.'
46
If the dissenting judges, despite disclaimers, emphasized a relatively
restrictive approach (after all, they pointed out, since the mandates rep-
resented the first example in history of conquerors exercising self-re-
straint in victory for the benefit of mankind, their gesture should not be
unreasonably enlarged by judicial construction 4 7), the majority was able
to blend technical points with broad moral and philosophical considera-
tions.
The mandate, asserted the court, was not a unilateral act of the League
Council. 148 Terminology was not important here, nor was the form-or
formlessness-of the instrument. 1 49 Judge Jessup, in passing, took time
to state that "define," as used by the Council in the last clause of the
preamble of the mandate, meant merely "to make definite" by approving
in substance the draft of the Principal Powers.'
While the entire majority agreed that the mandate was an international
treaty,151 they differed on the grounds for so holding. All, however, agreed
that the South African government was barred by principles of estoppel
from disclaiming the existence of a convention on which alone it could
base its legal right to have assumed peacetime administration of South
West Africa and to have continued such administration for forty years.
152
The court added that the provisions for depositing the mandate in the
archives and for forwarding certified copies to all signatories of the Ver-
sailles Treaty indicated that it was intended and understood to be a
144 Id. at 521.
145 Id. at 474, 478.
146 Id. at 478.
147 Id. at 482-83.
148 Id. at 330 (opinion of the court).
149 Id. at 331, 405 (separate opinion of Jessup, J.).
150 Id. at 397.
151 Id. at 330 (opinion of the court).
152 If the law of estoppel has any meaning or application in international law the
Respondent would be precluded from raising such an issue on the face of its own con-
duct during the past 40 years.
Id. at 440 (separate opinion of Mbanefo, J.); accord, id. at 372-73 (separate opinion of
Bustamante, J.). Judge Bustamante pointed out that the South African representative
submitted a copy of the mandate as an annex to the objections, calling it "the agreement."
Id. at 373.
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treaty;' and Judge Bustamante pointed out that the South African
government had expressed no reservations on its receipt.154
The majority scouted equally the objection of invalidity ab initio based
on failure to register the mandate as a treaty.' 5 In addition, however,
it was argued that the formal acts performed in connection with the man-
date were substantially equivalent or, at any rate, equal in effect to
registration under Article 18; 1 that the mandate was an internal agree-
ment of an international organization rather than a treaty between states
requiring registration; 157 that the true agreement was reached in 1919
before the Covenant and its registration requirement came into exist-
ence; 5 and (reminiscent of litigation involving registration requirements
wherever they exist) that, since the purpose of Article 18 was to prevent
"secret treaties," publication of League proceedings achieved the purpose
equally well, whereas the strict interpretation of registration urged by
the respondent would penalize those whom it was intended to protect.'59
Judge Jessup met many of the dissenters' arguments head on. He
started by challenging one of their fundamental premises:
The notion that there is a clear and ordinary meaning of the word "treaty"
is a mirage. The fundamental question is whether a State has given a
promise or undertaking from which flow international legal rights and
duties.'60
The entire mandate, he argued, was instinct with obligation 6 '-obliga-
tions which the South African government had "voluntarily agreed to
incur."' 2 He found that the government had undertaken the following
engagements: (a) duties owed by all mandatories to co-members of the
League under Article 22 of the Covenant; (b) duties owed under agree-
ments with the Principal Powers to exercise the allotted mandate ac-
cording to the specified terms; (c) obligations under the third paragraph
of the mandate to accept the mandated territory and the terms under
which it was offered; (d) duties under the mandate as a whole to act in
the spirit of the instrument; and (e) the obligation under Article 7 to
submit to the jurisdiction of the court in disputes affecting the mandate. 163
353 Id. at 331-32 (opinion of the court).
154 Id. at 373 (separate opinion of Bustamante, J.).
155 Id. at 332 (opinion of the court), 420 (separate opinion of Jessup, J.).156 Id. at 332 (opinion of the court), 372 (separate opinion of Bustamante, J.), 421
(separate opinion of Jessup, J.).
157 Id. at 360 (separate opinion of Bustamante, J.), 372 (separate opinion of Busta-
mante, J.).
158 Id. at 332 (opinion of the court).
150 Id. at 420 (separate opinion of Jessup, J.).
160 Id. at 402.
161 Id. at 398.
162 Id. at 401. "[T]he obligations were certainly not imposed upon the Mandatory,
which, under Article 22(2) of the Covenant, was a State 'willing to accept' them." Ibid.
163 Id. at 398-401.
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Judge Mbanefo contended more simply that the mandate was not an
act of the Council, but a part of the Covenant itself (an cannex"), which
had the same validity and binding force (and, presumably, parties) as
the Covenant.'64 He noted that all the "C" mandates had the same terms
and were established to implement Article 22.11 Setting forth the mandate
in a separate document instead of appending it to the Covenant, as had
apparently been intended at first, did not affect its character, he claimed;
and the recitation of the preamble was indeed significant as showing the
interrelationships which linked all the engagements of the mandatory and
the'League members.1 66
The court, relying heavily on its 1950 advisory opinion,'16 7 held that
the mandate was:
[A] special type of instrument composite in nature and instituting a novel
. . . regime. It incorporates [various agreements between South Africa
and -the Principal Powers or the League Council] .... It is an instrument
having the character of a treaty or convention .... 168
Judge Bustamante elaborated on this line of approach, attempting to
establish a new concept of mandate from which valid conclusions as to
the jurisdiction of the court would naturally flow. He asserted that the
mandate constituted a:
[L]egal institution incorporated in international legislation . . . . [A] n
integral part of the Treaty of Versailles .... The system and the agree-
ment operate as an inseparable whole whose elements, which are conditional
one upon the other, form an organic unit.169
The concept of mandate, he noted, arose from the new post-World War I
anticolonialist sentiment and concern for the rights of underdeveloped
peoples, which led to a system of tutelage under advanced nations "on
behalf of the League" in accordance with the "sacred trust" to promote
the well-being and development of such peoples. 7 ° The concept of man-
date should be interpreted in the light of this background, with an eye
164 Id. at 441 (separate opinion of Mbanefo, J.).
165 Id. at 442.
166 Id. at 441.
167 SWA Status. However, Judges Spender and Fitzmaurice felt that:
[T]he Court in 1950 did little more than find, on various grounds, that the dissolution
of the League . . . had not caused the Mandate to lapse, and that despite this disso-
lution, the Mandate was still in force. But the Court did not [consider] . . . the basis
upon which the Mandate was in force nor . . . whether it was still in force as a
treaty or convention . ...
SWA Cases 472 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting). Judge Basdevant indicated
that he found the court's theoretical approach in the present case (and, by implication,
in the earlier one) insufficient. Id. at 463-64 (Basdevant, J., dissenting).
168 Id. at 331 (opinion of the court).
169 Id. at 356 (separate opinion of Bustamante, J.).
170 Id. at 350-51.
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to its similarities to the municipal law of trust, guardianship, and man-
date.1'1
Judge Bustamante found a "contractual element" present in the
mandate, noting that South Africa had already expressed acceptance of
the mandate to the Great Powers before the League came into existence. 72
But he stressed that the mandate emphasizes responsibilities, not rights.
[T]he agreement does not ... suppose any real balance between the obli-
gations and the rights of the parties. The legal concept is nearer that of
the unilateral contracts of private law . . . . The rights granted to the
Mandatory are for . . . the better fulfilment of its obligations towards the
country under tutelage. The concept of obligation predominates. 73
In general, arguments as to the nature of the mandate impliedly included
Article 7."4 Since, however, the dissenters had contended that the article
was separate and invalid, the majority replied directly to these conten-
tions.
Judges Mbanefo and Bustamante felt that the Council, in accepting
Article 7, was merely carrying out its duties under the Covenant to define
the "degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by
the Mandatory,' 7  since in their view Article 7 limited the power of
administration conferred on the mandatory.77 Legally speaking, Article
7 was analogous to the "optional clause'177 of the statute of the Perma-
nent Court, ratified by the Union in 1921, by which it agreed in advance
to accept the court's jurisdiction in certain instances. 7 1 Moreover, Ar-
ticle 7 was a "necessary security" for the mandate system: the unanimity
rule of the League, which allowed states to vote in matters affecting their
own interests, necessitated some decisive legal mechanism for settling
17' Id. at 352.
172 Id. at 358.
173 Id. at 357.
174 It is "one of the major provisions of the Mandate system." Id. at 361.
175 Covenant, art. 22, f1 8.
176 SWA Cases 374 (separate opinion of Bustamante, J.), 442 (separate opinion of
Mbanefo, J.).
177 Stat. Int'l Ct. of just., art. 36, fI 2. The article was in every relevant particular
identical with the "optional clause," also Article 36 para. 2, of the statute of the present
court, which reads:
The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize
as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state
accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes con-
cerning:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact [constituting] . . . a breach of an international obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation . . . for the breach of an international obliga-
tion.
178 SWA Cases 360 (separate opinion of Bustamante, 3.); cf. Judge Bustamante's com-
ment on the application to Article 7 of the Mandate of the rules governing the optional
clause. Id. at 375.
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deadlocks in matters concerning the mandates. 179 The court added that
the two-thirds rule of the U.N. obviates the necessity for a compromis-
sory clause in the trusteeship agreements. 8 °
Judge Jessup, on the other hand, agreed with the dissenters that Article
7 was outside the scope of Article 22(8) of the Covenant.'8 ' To him,
however, it had an even more solid separate contractual basis: it stemmed
from the agreement between South Africa and the Principal Powers as
to the terms on which the mandate was allotted-the mandate declara-
tion merely "recorded" the agreement. 8 s He contended that Article 7
constituted a contract for the benefit of "third-State beneficiaries" (the
co-members of the League) as well as for the inhabitants of the man-
dates.8
3
The Mandate Is No Longer in Force. Even if the mandate were held to
have been a treaty, respondent argued that it had, as a matter of law,
lapsed upon dissolution of the League and that any obligations under it
had not been continued or revived.
According to the dissenting judges, the only possible "parties of the
second part" lost either their capacity or their existence with the demise
of the League.184 The judges warned that the mandate could not, there-
fore, possibly survive since the fundamental principle applicable to any
such case is that:
[R] ights . . .vested in persons or entities in a specified capacity, or as
members of a specified class, are not . . vested in them in their . . .indi-
vidual capacity, and therefore cease to be available ...if they lose the
specified capacity, or cease to be members of the indicated class .... 185
179 Id. at 336-37 (opinion of the court), 360 (separate opinion of Bustamante, J.), 374.
Under the unanimity rule . . . the Council could not impose its own view on the
Mandatory ... . [Aln advisory opinion of the Permanent Court . . .would not
have binding force . . . . [N]either the Council nor the League was entitled to appear
before the Court [in contentious proceedings]. The only effective recourse for protec-
tion of the sacred trust would be for a Member ...of the League to invoke Article
7 and bring the dispute ... to the Permanent Court for adjudication .... It is thus
seen what an essential part Article 7 was intended to play as one of the securities in
the Mandates System ....
Id. at 337 (opinion of the court).
180 Id. at 342.
181 Id. at 398 (separate opinion of Jessup, J.).
182 Ibid.
183 Id. at 409. He found acceptance (possibly necessary under this theory) in the
Assembly's acceptance of the "C" mandates and in the "continuing conduct of both the
Council and the Assembly with reference to the administration of the C Mandates," although
consent of the beneficiary might be presumed, as it may be in private law. Id. at 410.
International law, not being a formalistic system, holds States legally bound by their
undertakings in a variety of circumstances and does not need either to insist or to
deny that the beneficiaries are "parties" to the undertakings.
Id. at 411.
184 Id. at 499 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting), 503 (Spender and Fitzmaurice,
JJ., dissenting); text accompanying note 133 supra.
185 SWA Cases 467-68.
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More than the simple loss of the other party, however, dissolution of
the League resulted in the absence of all international organs with any
legal concern as to the mandates. The consequence was, the South Af-
ricans explained, that the obligations of the mandate which related to
administrative (and, perforce, to judicial) supervision, being "contrac-
tual," necessarily became extinct on the dissolution of the League, while
the rights and obligations of administration of South West Africa, being
"objective," continued."' 8
Since the respondent and the dissenting judges considered the lapse
of the mandate substantially-self-evident, their primary concern was to
show that the U.N. had not succeeded the League as to any international
treaty obligations or revived them.117 They drew their evidence largely
from the Charter and from the records of the San Francisco Preparatory
Conference (drafting the U.N. Charter), the early sessions of the U.N.,
and the closing meetings of the League of Nations.
The dissenting South African judge turned to the Charter. There was
no provision anywhere in it, he stated, for continuing Article 7 of the
mandate nor for substituting any organ of the U.N. for the League Coun-
cil or the Permanent Mandates Commission; 88 by contrast, Article 37
of the annexed statute of the International Court specifically provides
that the new court is substituted for the old.8 9
There can be no doubt that the parties to the Charter would have used
positive terms had they intended that the provisions of the Mandates
would be amended [to] ... remain effective .. .until each -territory was
placed under the Trusteeship System; they would not have used language
incapable of having this meaning.190
Moreover, he found it significant that Article 80(1) of the Charter, which
safeguarded peoples, states, and "terms of existing international instru-
ments" against alteration of rights occasioned by the institution of
trusteeship, did not cover the case of alteration of rights arising from
the dissolution of the League.' 9 "The 'rights' of the peoples of South
West Africa did not include the continued application of Articles 6 and 7
of the Mandate after the demise of the organization on which these ar-
ticles depended for their fulfilment."' 92
To establish that the natural inferences from the Charter were correct,
the dissenters then turned to the historical record, demonstrating first
186 Id. at 332-33 (opinion of the court), 369 (separate opinion of Bustamante, J.), 527-29
(Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting).
187 Id. at 635 (van Wyk, J., dissenting), 658 (van Wyk, J., dissenting).
188 Id. at 612.
189 Id. at 615.
190 Id. at 647.
191 Id. at 618.
192 Id. at 646.
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that the U.N. was not, from a "legal and historical point of view," the
successor to the League however much it might be so considered in a
"loose and general sense."' 93 They pointed out that two of the five major
postwar powers, Russia and the United States, were not members of the
League at its dissolution and that both were opposed to making the U.N.
"the League under a different name or an automatic successor in law.
. The many complicated treaties between the U.N. and the League
regarding its assets and functions were further evidence of the lack
of automatic succession, as was the conduct of League members on the
eve of its demise. 9 5 Nor is there any rule bf law providing that:
[W]here an international organization comes to an end, and another ...
performing similar functions exists at that time, that the powers and
functions of the dissolved organization pass automatically to the organs
of the new organization .... 196
As for the mandates system, it was even clearer to the dissenting judges
that there was no direct or automatic succession to any U.N. organs. The
dissenters pointed out that the delegates to the Preparatory Conference
established the completely new, if substantially similar, trusteeship sys-
tem 19 7 (as well as provisions for other "non-self-governing" territories'98 ).
As Article 77(1) of the Charter seemed to indicate,'99 and as the court
advised in 1950,20 there was no binding obligation to place mandated
territories under trusteeship and no evidence whatsoever that the U.N.
was to supervise mandates not placed under trusteeship.2 1' The delegates
deliberately drafted Chapters eleven to thirteen of the Charter without
any such provisions despite statements by the Union representative that
his country wanted to annex South West Africa and had no obligation or
193 Id. at 611.
194 Ibid.
195 Id. at 609, 611.
196 Id. at 603.
197 Id. at 532 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting), 612-13 (van Wyk, J., dis-
senting).
198 Charter, ch. 11 ("Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories"), comprising
arts. 73-74. Judges Spender and Fitzmaurice argued (id. at 541-42) that "B" and "C" man-
dates not placed under trusteeship should automatically have been considered nonself-govern-
ing territories subject to Chapter 11. But this would have been equivalent to terminating
the mandate and recognizing the annexation of South West Africa, for (a) the unvarnished
term for "non-self-governing territory" is "colony" and (b) according to Judge van Wyk
(id. at 634) the mandatory could not possibly be subjected simultaneously to two separate
and possibly conflicting supervisory regimes.
199 Id. at 613 (van Wyk, J., dissenting):
Article 77(1) . . . provides that the trusteeship system shall apply "to such territories
in the following categories as may be placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agree-
ments: (a) territories now held under mandate . . . " From this it is clear that there
could not have been any contemplation that the Trusteeship System would automatically
. . apply to the territories held under mandate. Only trusteeship agreements could
bring these territories under the Trusteeship System ....
200 SWA Status 144.
201 SWA Cases 612-13 (van Wyk, J., dissenting).
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intention to place it under trusteeship and despite indications by other
countries as well that automatic transfer of mandates to the trusteeship
system was unlikely." 2
Furthermore, the U.N. Preparatory Commission (set up after the Con-
ference) rejected a proposal for a temporary Trusteeship Committee to
advise the General Assembly on problems arising out of the transfer to
the U.N. of functions and responsibilities exercised under the mandates
system. Instead it recommended that the Assembly adopt a resolution
urging states which administered mandates to propose trusteeship agree-
ments at the forthcoming General Assembly." 3 Thus there was no basis
for claiming that the U.N. succeeded the League under the mandate
agreement. And in view of the substantial differences between the man-
dates and the trusteeship systems-particularly in the unanimity rule-
there was no basis for assuming any new or revived obligations on the
part of the Union to the U.N. °4
The dissenting judges found confirmation of their conclusions in the
early history of the U.N. A special committee on Palestine (an "A"
mandate) reported in 1947 that in its opinion there was no supervisory
authority as to the administration of the territory after the dissolution
of the League.20 5 And not until 1948 was there any suggestion in the U.N.
that possibly some of its organs had been substituted for those of the
League in relation to the mandates. 06
Evidence from the final meetings of the League was, in their opinion,
cumulative. The judges pointed out that the League rejected a proposed
resolution which, in order to avoid a "period of interregnum," would have
recommended that the U.N. take over supervision of the mandates on an
interim basis until the Trusteeship Council was established. The substi-
tute which passed merely noted that the mandatories had expressed their
intention to administer their territories in accordance with their obliga-
tions until other arrangements were concluded with the U.N.20 7
As far as Article 7 was concerned, they asserted that it was never con-
sidered at Geneva.20 8 Had any question of extending it or transferring
202 Id. at 533 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting), 536-37 (Spender and Fitz-
maurice, JJ., dissenting), 616-18 (van Wyk, J., dissenting), 622-24 (van Wyk, J., dissenting).
203 Id. at 536 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting).
204 Id. at 610 (van Wyk, J., dissenting). Other differences not specifically referred to
by the judges include the definition of the objective of trusteeship as "self-government or
independence" (Art. 76(b)), compared with the vague "well-being and development" of
Art. 22(1) of the Covenant; and the power of the Trusteeship Council to make periodic
inspections of the trust territories (Art. 87(c)).
205 SWA Cases 636.
20 Id. at 636-37.
20T Id. at 535 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting), 538 n.1 (Spender and Fitz-
maurice, JJ., dissenting), 631-32 (van Wyk, J., dissenting).
208 Id. at 544-45 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting).
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jurisdiction under it to the new court been raised there, it certainly would
have been voted down.20 9 As to the South African mandate particularly,
"we think the inherent probabilities are so obviously against it, as to place
the matter virtually beyond discussion .. .. ,,21o
The dissenting judges did feel obliged, however, to explain away two
statements on which the majority placed great emphasis. The first was
the Union representative's "assurance" to the League that his country
would "continue to administer the territory scrupulously in accordance
with the obligations of the Mandate .... ,211 This did not constitute an
international agreement, Judges Spender and Fitzmaurice contended, for
it was a mere unilateral declaration, not a compact.212 Obviously, they
added, the mandatory was simply referring to the actual process of ad-
ministration and not to any other "collateral" obligations, particularly
since the Union spokesman had noted that disappearance of various
League organs would preclude "compliance with the letter of the Man-
date. '21 3 This statement and the League resolution on mandates:
[C]annot be regarded as constituting binding undertakings to continue to
apply all the provisions of the Mandate . . . irrespective of how [they]
... would be affected by the dissolution of the League; and we are unable
to . . . infer from them ... the indefinite prolongation of a jurisdictional
obligation about to lapse according to its terms ... .214
The judges pointed out further that a renewal or revival of obligations
(inferred from the "assurance") would have subjected South Africa in
the future to considerably more onerous conditions, for the U.N. does
not operate under the unanimity rule-and, Judge van Wyk asserted,
it was only the "procedural provisions" of the Covenant which had ever
persuaded Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa to subject their
conquests to the international mandates regime. 215 Moreover, if renewed
obligations under Article 7 were inferred (on the part of South Africa to
other states, be it noted, but not of other states to South Africa216), the
209 Id. at 530 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting), 634 (van Wyk, J., dissenting).
210 Id. at 530 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting).
211 See text accompanying note 49 supra.
212 "Nor would a statement (e.g., of intention) made, or an assurance given, in the
course of, say, a speech at an international conference or assembly, be a treaty or conven-
tion." SWA Cases 476 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting).
213 Id. at 527 & n.1 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting). Judge van Wyk explained
what his government had meant by the assurance as follows:
[Respondent's representative] said that the Respondent would continue to administer
the territory "scrupulously in accordance with the obligations of the Mandate for the
advancement and promotion of the interests of the inhabitants, as she has done during
the past six years when meetings of the Mandates Commission could not be held".
During this period referred to by the Respondent, Article 6 [annual reporting] was not
applied. Nor was Article 7 invoked. ...
Id. at 631 (van Wyk, J., dissenting).
214 Id. at 529 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting).
215 Id. at 600 (van Wyk, J., dissenting).
216 Id. at 546 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting), 597 (van Wyk, J., dissenting).
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new consequences would be even harsher, for the U.N. Charter has tooth-
buds unknown to the League: decisions of the International Court may
be "enforced" by recourse to the U.N. Security Council.21 7 These circum-
stances made it:
[Q]uite inconceivable that a State which was aiming at the incorporation
of the Mandated territory in its own territory could possibly have been
willing . . . simultaneously to perpetuate, possibly indefinitely, an obli-
gation of compulsory jurisdiction ... about to become inoperative.218
The changed consequences which would have resulted from such an in-
ference necessitated strict construction of the "assurance.) 219
The second statement was the promise of the South African delegate
in the Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee of the U.N. Assembly that after
consultation with the white and nonwhite population of South West Africa
concerning annexation, the decision of the Union "would be submitted
to the General Assembly for judgment.1 220 This offer, said the dissenters:
[C]annot be taken as an acknowledgement that the supervisory functions
of the Council of the League had been transferred to -the General Assembly.
It was no more than a specific undertaking to ask the General Assembly
for its judgment on this particular issue... 221
In overruling respondent's contention as to the lapse of the mandate,
the majority placed primary emphasis on legal and philosophical, rather
than historical, arguments.
They found the South African thesis of continuing rights in the mandate
without any corresponding obligations as distasteful morally and legall y
22
as the contention that it had governed South West Africa since World
War I on the basis of a nonexistent treaty.223 The court had called the
first argument unjustified in 1950,224 and it was still of the same opin-
ion.225 The majority found reasons for holding both that the original
obligations continued in force despite the dissolution of the League and
that in any case they had been transferred to the U.N. or renewed.
judge Jessup argued that the obligation of Article 7, at least, derived
217 Id. at 546 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting). Charter, art. 94, ff 2 provides:
If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a
judgment rendered by the [International] Court, the other party may have recourse
to the Security Council, which may . . . make recommendations or decide upon
measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.
218 SWA Cases 530.
219 Id. at 511.
220 See text accompanying note 48 supra.
221 SWA Cases 624 (van Wyk, J., dissenting).
222 Id. at 333-34 (separate opinion of Bustamante, J.), 416-17 (separate opinion of Jessup,
J.), 443 (separate opinion of Mbanefo, J.).
223 See text accompanying notes 152-59 supra.
224 SWA Status 133.
225 SWA Cases 371 (separate opinion of Bustamante, 3.), 416-17 (separate opinion of
Jessup, J.), 443-44 (separate opinion of Mbanefo, 3.).
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from the agreement between South Africa and the Principal Powers,
was unaffected by the dissolution of the League.226 The nature of the
article, he had already suggested, was that of a "third-State beneficiary"
contract.227 Alternatively he suggested that Article 7 might be considered
a continuing offer not yet withdrawn when Ethiopia and Liberia started
their proceedings.2 ' In any case he found that the dissolution of the
League had not introduced any element of frustration or impossibility
of performance by South Africa; so the mandate subsisted.229
To Judge Mbanefo the mandate was "a bundle of rights and obliga-
tions, not a physical edifice, although it has physical aspects .... ,280
These rights, including the right to invoke the court under Article 7,
continued undisturbed since the purpose (development of the people of
the mandated territory) "has not yet been achieved, and no one has sug-
gested that it has been abandoned or rendered invalid with the dissolu-
tion of the League . ... ""'
The theories by which South Africa's obligations were renewed or
transferred to the U.N. were more varied and numerous.
By reading Articles 92, 93(1), and 110(4) of the Charter2"2 with Ar-
ticle 3 7 of the statute of the International Court, the court held that South
Africa, as a member of the U.N., was a party to the statute of the court,
to which disputes under valid treaties formerly referrable to the Perma-
nent Court were now to be taken.233 Since South African ratification took
place in 1945, when the League, the old court, and the mandate were all
in existence, the obligations of the mandate were still effective, and their
transfer to the new international bodies was, as of that time, voluntarily
assumed by the Union.28 4
To sum up, the fact of the Republic of South Africa becoming a Member
of the United Nations was the legal link which . . .established continuity
between the two world organizations and between the two systems for the
protection of the former German colonies. [Emphasis by the court.] 235
226 See text accompanying note 182 supra.
227 See text accompanying note 183 supra.
228 SWA Cases 410 (separate opinion of Jessup, J.), 419 (separate opinion of Jessup, J.).
229 Id. at 414.
230 Id. at 444 (separate opinion of Mbanefo, J.).
231 Id. at 445.
232 Article 92 provides that the statute of the International Court, which is based upon
the statute of the Permanent Court, "forms an integral part of the present Charter." Article
93(1) provides that U.N. members are ipso facto parties to the statute of the court. And
article 110 (4) provides that states signatory to the Charter which ratify it after it comes
into force become original members on the date of deposit of their respective ratifications.
233 SWA Cases 334-35 (opinion of the court), 418 (separate opinion of Jessup, j.).
234 Id. at 335 (opinion of the court).
235 Id. at 370 (separate opinion of Bustamante, J.). Further, Judge Jessup pointed out:
It would not be in accordance with the spirit and iitent of Articles 36(5) and 37 [of
the statute of the present court] to interpret them in such a way as to leave a gap
through which would fall to the ground such an agreement as is recorded in Article
7 of the Mandate.
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Moreover, Judge Bustamante added, when South Africa, in September
1955, accepted the so-called "optional clause" of the statute of the new
court,"8 it confirmed the court's jurisdiction over disputes arising out
of the chronologically earlier Article 7 of the mandate.23 7
The court then considered briefly the closing sessions of the League
Assembly and found that:
[O]bviously an agreement was reached among all the Members . . . to
continue the different Mandates as far as it was practically feasible... not-
withstanding the dissolution of the League itself 238 [and that this agree-
ment was unanimous 239] ....
This agreement was evidenced by the dissolution resolution, the dis-
cussions, and "the whole set of surrounding circumstances."24 ° And an
important element, Judge Jessup insisted, was the South African "assu-
rance" that the obligation of Article 7 would continue to exist for the
benefit of the then members of the League.241 "This was an undertaking
of an international character by which the Union of South Africa assumed
an international obligation .... ,142 He suggested an element of estoppel,
noting the League's "reliance" on this and similar declarations.243
Judges Mbanefo and Bustamante added that South West Africa was
still involved in what was properly a winding-up operation (in prepara-
tion for trusteeship2 44). During such transitional period the saving clause
of Article 80(1) of the Charter preserved the mandate obligations. 245
Since Judge Bustamante felt, despite the court's 1950 opinion, that the
Charter compelled the mandatories to place their mandates under the
U.N. trusteeship system,2 4 he pointed out carefully that despite a lack
of "automatic succession" the Charter did provide "the necessary ma-
chinery" for continuance of the mandates.247 Following the court's rea-
soning in part, he claimed:
Members of the United Nations, by virtue of their voluntary acceptance
Id. at 415.
Article 36(5) provides that declarations made under the "optional clause" [Art. 36(2)] of
the statute of the Permanent Court (see text accompanying notes 177-78 supra; note 177
supra) which are still in force "shall be deemed, as between the parties to the present Statute,
to be acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court .... 
236 This is quoted in note 177 supra.
237 SWA Cases 376 (separate opinion of Bustamante, J.).
238 Id. at 338 (opinion of the court).
239 Id. at 341.
240 Ibid.
241 Id. at 419 (separate opinion of Jessup, J.).
242 Id. at 418.
248 Ibid.
244 Id. at 383-84 (separate opinion of Bustamante, J.), 446 (separate opinion of Mbanefo,
245 Id. at 383-84 (separate opinion of Bustamante, J.).
246 Id. at 383.
247 Id. at 364.
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* , .of the Charter, assumed all the obligations flowing therefrom, and,
consequently .. .a Mandatory . . .at the same time freely accepted the
obligation to renew or to transform the Mandate into a Trusteeship agree-
ment. The negotiation of a new agreement is [not] ... imposed by force:
it is a pact ... concluded ... when the Charter was signed by the Manda-
tory. [Emphasis by the court.] 248
At any rate, Judge Bustamante argued, following the analogy to the
law of guardianship which he had drawn earlier, the true role of the
League under the mandates was as a protector of the country under
tutelage:
In such circumstances, the disappearance of a guardian in the realm of
municipal private law would raise no difficulty since the legal systems
of States have provided means of replacing a guardian . . . without any
disturbance ... of the guardianship... 2
49
Despite the imperfect analogy, he felt that the replacement of the League
by the U.N., an international organization with the same objectives, should
be treated in the same manner. 250 He found support for his interpretation
in Article 80(1) of the Charter, which preserved rights of peoples and
the terms of existing international instruments (obviously mandates)
pending trusteeship; in the assertions of the founders of the U.N. that
dissolution of the League would not affect the functioning of the mandates
in essence, but only in form; and in the final resolution of the League
reciting the intentions of the mandatories in the period preceding trustee-
ship.251
(2) Requirements for Bringing a Proceeding Under Article 7
The respondent's remaining arguments were directed to proving that
even if Article 7 were still in force, the applicants did not meet the
requirements for bringing a proceeding under it. The respondent's argu-
ments were based on the second, third, and fourth preliminary objec-
tions: that the applicants were not "Members of the League"; that the
dispute was not of the type to which the compromissory clause applied;
and that there had been no negotiations to try to settle the dispute, as
required by Article 7.
Applicants Not Members of the League. Since Article 7 provided for
submission to the court of disputes between the mandatory and "another
Member of the League," the respondent argued that Article 7 depended
on the existence of the League for its fulfilment, "as without a League
248 Id. at 366.
249 Id. at 363.
250 Id. at 363.
251 Id. at 363-65.
-[Vol. 49
SOUTH WEST AFRICA
in existence there could not be a Member of the League."2 52 The con-
clusions it drew from this premise were summarized by ad hoc Judge
van Wyk:
Article 7 ... cannot be invoked as there are no longer Members of the
League to do so. The Respondent has not been a party to any agreement
... that after the dissolution of the League ex-Members of the League or
Members of the United Nations would be substituted for Member of the
League in Article 7 .... [Therefore] Applicants have no locus standi
and this Court no jurisdiction .... 253
The dissenting judges proceeded to this conclusion by arguing, first,
that only "another Member of the League" might invoke the jurisdiction
of the court (citing the rejection of a German complaint regarding
Ruanda-Urundi which was made to the Permanent Mandates Commis-
sion before Germany joined the League).254
Secondly, they contended that the phrase "another Member of the
League" meant precisely what it said: "any State which, at any given
moment was-and only if and so long as it was-a Member .... 255
Since the applicants claimed that this phrase must be interpreted to
mean a member of the League at the time of its dissolution (and presently
a member of the U.N.), the dissenters demonstrated why, in their opinion,
such an interpretation was unwarranted.
They examined in turn the various theories on which they felt the
applicants might claim that "members" should be interpreted to have
included "former members of the League" or "UN members," and in
most instances their rejoinders were based on one or both of the two
following arguments: (a) future dissolution of the League simply was
not contemplated in 1920, as the repeated use of the phrase "Member of
the League," rather than some broader term, indicates; 256 hence no
broader concept of "member" could have been contemplated.257 (b) Any
broader meaning of "member" would have been totally unacceptable to
the mandatories in 1920; the reluctance with which several of the World
War I Allies submitted their conquests to the mandates regime was so
great that they would never have done so at all if they had felt that
in the indefinite future almost any state could haul them into court if
it didn't like the way they ran their mandates. 258
252 Id. at 598 (van Wyk, J., dissenting).
253 Id. at 658 (van Wyk, J., dissenting).
254 Id. at 508 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, 3J., dissenting); cf. Judge Jessup's comments,
id. at 412.
255 Id. at 508 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, J3., dissenting).
256 Id. at 599 (van Wyk, J., dissenting).
257 Id. at 514 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, J3., dissenting), 601 (van Wyk, J., dissenting).
258 Id. at 453 (Winiarski, President, dissenting), 514 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, 33., dis-
senting), 600 (van Wyk, J., dissenting), 608-09 (van Wyk, J., dissenting).
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[In 1920] willingness to submit to compulsory adjudication at all was a
comparative rarity, and would certainly not have been forthcoming for an
obligation of limitless duration under unknown conditions 259
To the argument that Article 7 survived as an integral part of the
mandate and that to enable it to be invoked usefully "ex-member"
must be read for "member," the dissenters replied that Article 7
could survive only by giving rights to members of an "existing" League of
Nations.2 6° The court cannot, Judges Spender and Fitzmaurice ad-
monished: "Both rely on the continued presence of Article 7 in the
Mandate instrument, and refuse to apply it in accordance with the terms
in which it figures there." '2 61 As to the argument that principles of
third-State law might cause the rights under Article 7 to survive:
[T]hey can only survive according to -their terms. The States concerned
having, by their own act, divested themselves of the capacity in which
they enjoyed these rights, can no longer claim them . . . for no doctrine
of third-State rights can [enable] .. . third States to . .. claim rights
they have themselves . .. renounced.262
Again they pointed out that rights available to persons or entities in one
capacity do not continue when the capacity terminates or changes "un-
less special arrangements have been made to produce this result .... Y263
The dissenters indicated that in their opinion Ethiopia and Liberia
were asking the court to rewrite the mandate not only to cover the dis-
solution of the League (in the accomplishment of which they had been
voluntary cooperators! ),264 but also the creation of the U.N., trusteeship,
etc. This the court could not undertake.265 The time to have handled this
problem was 1945-1946; and as they had observed in connection with
earlier arguments, failure to do so was deliberate on the part of all, in-
.cluding representatives of the states which were now seeking revision.26 6
Since the dissenters did not, in any case, accept the theory that Article
7 was essential for the protection of the inhabitants of the mandated
territories,2 6 7 they found no justification for giving an "unnatural" mean-
ing to "Member of the League.
' 268
Finally, the dissenting judges ruled out the argument that "ex-member"
-or "UN member" had been substituted for "member" under some theory
of succession or of limited de facto survival of an entity which has been
259 Id. at 514 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting).
260 Id. at 517.
261 Ibid.
262 Id. at 509-10.
263 Id. at 510.
264 Id. at 509.
265 Id. at 514-15.
266 Id. at 515.
267 Id. at 518-19.
268 Id. at 599 (van Wyk, J., dissenting).
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formally dissolved.269 Certainly, they contended, the South African gov-
ernment had never agreed to any such changeY.17 Furthermore, there was
no general principle of law that when one international organization
comes to an end and another one performing similar functions exists
at the time, the rights of the members of the former pass to the members
of the latter "irrespective of the intention of the parties."27 '
In refusing to accept the construction which the respondent and the
dissenting judges put upon the phrase "another Member of the League,"
the majority stated that such a literal interpretation of the words would
be contrary to their "spirit, purpose and context. 2 72 The proper reading
was the one insisted upon by Judge McNair in his 1950 concurring
opinion: 278 they should be held to be a means of identification ("descrip-
tive of a class or category"), rather than a "permanent condition re-
quired for the role of applicant in legal proceedings."274 Judge Jessup
suggested that since the mandates were drawn during a period when
the League was expected to become universal, the specification, "member,"
was intended to bar ex-enemies until they became League members.
The reasons for such a limitation no longer applied in 1946 when the
League was dissolved; hence, cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lexY 75
He argued extensively by analogy to the rights of missionaries of
members, protected by Article 5 of the mandate; in their case the
loss of the quality of member of the League "did not introduce any
element of frustration which would impede the Mandatory's obligation,"
and he found this equally true of the obligations under Article 7.276 How-
ever, he added:
If the Mandatory claimed the right to limit the privileges to . . .States
which were Members .. .when the League came to an end, the claim
would be reasonable and ... avoid any charge that there was imposed on
the Mandatory an obligation more onerous than that which it had origi-
nally assumed.2 77
Judge Bustamante's elaborate reasoning on this point harked back
269 Id. at 602-03.
270 Id. at 610-11, 635, 658.
271 Id. at 603.
272 Id. at 336 (opinion of the court).
273 SWA Status 158-59 (separate opinion of McNair, J.).
274 SWA Cases 382 (separate opinion of Bustamante, J.) [emphasis by the court], 411
(separate opinion of Jessup, J. (paraphrasing McNair, J.)). Judge Jessup pointed out that
under this theory the states which qualified might fluctuate from time to time (referring
id. at 416-17 to the case of Brazil, also mentioned by the dissenting judges, id. at 508-09,
which had voluntarily withdrawn from the League), but that at any particular moment
South Africa could always identify them precisely. Id. at 414.
275 Id. at 412 (separate opinion of Jessup, J.).
276 Id. at 409, 411-13, 414, 416-17. However, the Rev. Michael Scott, a British national,
was barred from returning to South West Africa by the South African government.
277 Id. at 412-13.
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to his concept of the mandate as an institution for the development of
people under tutelage. The recognition of the rights of such peoples led
logically to the conclusion that all members of the League were jointly
and severally responsible for the fulfilment of this sacred trust of
civilization.2 7 Since the League as an organization had no effective
means of enforcing this responsibility in case of a dispute with the
mandatory, 7 9 the member states had been granted, by virtue of Article 7,
a right of legal intervention to safeguard the interests of the peoples
under tutelage; 280 and this right, being inherent in the mandate itself,
was incorporated in the "juridical heritage" of the member states, to
endure as long as the mandates.
From the entry into force of the agreement with the Mandatory, this right
of intervention of other ... Members becomes part of the legal heritage of
each.., not for the duration of the League... but for the duration of the
Mandate itself. Possession of this right . . . thus extends beyond the life
of the League ... even if the League is dissolved before the expiry of the
Mandate. 28' [Emphasis by the court.]
Furthermore, the majority claimed that there was an unanimous
agreement among all the states, including South Africa, which met to
dissolve the League282 that the mandates should be continued "however
imperfect the whole system would be . . . and as much as it would be
operable" until new arrangements were worked out with the U.N.283
Manifestly, this continuance of obligations... could not begin to operate
until... the dissolution of the League... and hence the literal objections
derived from... "another Member of the League.. ." are not meaningful,
since the resolution of 18 April 1946 was adopted precisely with a view to
averting them and continuing the Mandate as a treaty ... .284
judge Jessup, reverting to the South African "assurance" that it would
continue to administer South West Africa in accordance with its obliga-
tions, claimed that the court would have to deny completely the bona fides
of the South African government to assume that this "pledge" was made
"tongue-in-cheek" in the expectation that within a few days there would
be no state entitled to call the mandatory to account for the fulfilment
278 Id. at 355 (separate opinion of Bustamante, J.).
279 It might seek an advisory opinion from the Permanent Court. Covenant, art. 14.
According to Articles 34-35 of the statute of the Permanent Court, only "states" might be
parties before the court in contentious proceedings.
280 SWA Cases 337 (opinion of the court), 361-62, 378 (separate opinion of Busta-
mante, J.).
281 Id. at 378, 382.
282 The "voluntary" act of dissolution differed from the voluntary act of withdrawing
from membership (cf. the case of Brazil, note 274 supra), as the War had in fact destroyed
the League, and the final meetings merely solemnized the decease. Id. at 382-83 (separate
opinion of Bustamante, J.). But cf. id. at 509 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting).
283 Id. at 341 (opinion of the court).
284 Ibid.
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of its obligations. "The Court cannot thus impugn the good faith of the
Respondent ..... 28
Article 7 Did Not Apply to Dispute. In their memorials Ethiopia
and Liberia stated that they had brought the proceedings on the basis of
their "legal interest in seeing to it through judicial process that the
sacred trust of civilization created by the Mandate is not violated.) 28 6
The respondent denied that such an interest was sufficient to give the
court jurisdiction under Article 7, claiming that the interest must be
"personal and direct," arising out of obligations owed individually to
the applicant states or to their nationals.
28 7
In this connection Judge Morelli raised a point which he claimed was
anterior to any issue of jurisdiction. 288 He questioned whether there was,
legally speaking, any "dispute" at all of which the court could take
cognizance; if not, he claimed it should dismiss the proceeding before
considering the respondent's objections.2" 9 According to the judge, a
"dispute" existed only when there was both (a) a disagreement as to
law or fact or a conflict of interests29 ° and (b) a "manifestation of the
will, at least of one of the parties, consisting in the making of a claim or
of a protest."291 Then, seizing on the same facts which the dissenting
Commonwealth judges cited to back up their jurisdictional argument as
to the "dispute," he argued that Ethiopia and Liberia had continually
acted:
[I]n their capacity as members of a United Nations collegiate organ
guided not by their individual interest but by . .. the interest of the
285 Id. at 419 (separate opinion of Jessup, J.).
288 Memorials of Ethiopia and Liberia, pp. 62-63, SWA Cases, quoted by Judge
Winiarski in SWA Cases 456.
287 Ibid. (Winiarski, President, dissenting). The court summarized the South African
contention on this point, that the "dispute":
[Miust be given its generally accepted meaning in a context of a compulsory jurisdiction
clause and that, when so interpreted, it means a disagreement or conflict between the
Mandatory and another Member ... concerning the legal rights and interests of such
other Member in the matter before the Court ....
Id. at 343 (opinion of the court).
288 Id. at 565 (Morelli, J., dissenting).
289 Id. at 564-66, 569-70.
290 Id. at 566-67. But the interest may be either supposed or real:
Each State is the judge of its own interest. If a State, believing itself to have a certain
interest, advances a claim.. . . or makes a protest . . . that claim or that protest may
well constitute one of the elements of a dispute, independently of the real existence of
the interest in question.
Eifi . . there had been, on the part of Ethiopia and Liberia, a claim or protest
directed against South Africa and relating to an interest regarded by the two former
States [sic] as being their interest, the existence of a dispute could not be denied by
contesting the existence of that interest. The attitude of Ethiopia and Liberia would
in this respect be decisive ....
Id. at 570.
291 Id. at 567. Such manifestation must, of course, precede the commencement of the
proceeding. Id. at 568-69.
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Organization. They had in mind ... an alleged right of the Organization
and not . . .a right belonging to them individually .... 292
Hence they failed to demonstrate the second of the two necessary elements
of a dispute.
The court, however, quickly dismissed this contention. After noting
that the mere assertion of a dispute could not prove its existence any
more than a denial could establish its nonexistence, the majority held
that, although a mere conflict of interests did not constitute a dispute,
proof that the claim of one party was "positively opposed" by the other
was sufficient. 293 Tested by this criterion, the "opposing attitudes relating
to the performance of the obligations of the Mandate by the . . .
Mandatory" clearly did constitute a dispute. 94
Then, since Article 7 provided for the submission to the court of
"any dispute whatever ... relative to the interpretation or the applica-
tion ... of the Mandate," the burden seemed to fall on the respondent
to demonstrate what Judge Winiarski stated so flatly: "These words
clearly do not mean any dispute whatsoever .... . 295
The first argument was based on the general principle that a state may
institute proceedings before the court only if it has "a subjective right,
a real and existing individual interest which is legally protected. '2 6 In
this case the dissenting Commonwealth judges, employing Judge Morelli's
evidence to prove the jurisdictional issue, argued that Ethiopia and
Liberia had no personal quarrel with the Republic of South Africa, but
merely the same "political conflict of view" as many other U.N. members
relating to the conduct of the South West Africa mandate.2 1 7 It was
common knowledge that the real dispute was between the General
Assembly and the Republic, and the applicants admitted that they had
acted "at the instance of the Assembly" to uphold the mandate for the
benefit of the inhabitants of the territory, not in their own interest. On
that ground alone the judges claimed that there was no dispute between
South Africa and the applicants "in their individual capacities. '29 8
The relevant documents were alleged to support this view. A compari-
son of "A," "B," and "C" mandates showed that the "A" mandates con-
292 Id. at 571.
293 Id. at 328 (opinion of the court).
294 Ibid.
295 Id. at 455 (Winiarski, President, dissenting). [Emphasis added.]
296 Ibid.
297 Id. at 549 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting).
[F]or all the difference it would have made to the essential character of the present
proceedings, these might just as well have been brought by any other States coming
within the category of ex-Members of the former League of Nations. The pleadings
could have been identical, apart from the name of the plaintiffs.
Ibid.
298 Id. at 548.
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tained no "sacred trust of civilization" clause although they did have
adjudication clauses similar to Article 7; hence, the dissenting judges
contended, the adjudication clauses must have been intended to refer
to disputes about interests common to all the mandates, that is, to the
direct interests of the League members (and their nationals) in the
mandated territories. 99 Along the same line, Judge Winiarski pointed
out that the compromissory clause related to disputes which "cannot
be settled by negotiation." This phraseology, he claimed, was lifted from
traditional arbitration clauses and referred to a dispute in "the classic
sense," "a dispute which by its nature lends itself to settlement by negoti-
ation but which in a particular case cannot be so settled." However, a
dispute can be so settled only when the parties can deal freely with their
rights and interests; since the applicants acted as representatives of the
U.N. Assembly, their dispute was not one which could be settled by nego-
tiation and hence was not one of which the court could be seized. 00 Fur-
thermore, the judge contended that the requirement of Article 62 of the
statute of the court, that a state demonstrate "an interest of a legal
nature" to intervene in proceedings,'O should be applied to proceedings
brought under Article 7 of the mandate.302 And Judge van Wyk, still
unconvinced that the League Council was empowered to add the "new"
security of Article 7 to the mandate,30 3 felt it could be valid only if
limited to disputes about the direct interests of the complainant state.0 4
According to the dissenting judges the history of the mandate sup-
ported their interpretation of the general law. The only discussion of
Article 7 during the drafting of the mandate was in connection with the
commercial and other national rights clauses. 305 It was inconceivable
that any interpretation of the adjudication clause which would have
extended it to cover "conduct of the mandate" cases could have been
introduced without "violent debates" or references in the travaux prg-
paratoires and, more important, without saying so explicitly. 8 For, as
it was reiterated in connection with almost every objection, the manda-
tories were reluctant to submit to any mandates regime and certainly to
299 Id. at 559.
300 Id. at 457 (Winiarski, President, dissenting).
301 Stat. Intl Ct. of Just., art. 62, ff 1 reads:
Should a state consider that it has an interest of a legal nature which may be affected
by the decision in the case, it may submit a request to the Court to be permitted to
intervene.
302 SWA Cases 455-56 (Winiarski, President, dissenting).
303 Id. at 660-61 (van Wyk, J., dissenting); see text accompanying note 138 supra.
304 SWA Cases 661 (van Wyk, J., dissenting).
305 Id. at 555-56, 558 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting).
300 Id. at 453 (Winiarski, President, dissenting), 601 (van Wyk, J., dissenting).
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one which could have exercised any effective control over the way
they ran their mandates.11
7
It is not reasonable to assume that they would have agreed to ... super-
vision by every Member and every ex-Member ... armed with the right
to institute legal proceedings . . .whenever it was considered that the
Mandate had been breached or abused. [Emphasis by the court.]308
The compromissory clause, interpreted as the applicants urged, would
have created an actio popularis, "a novelty in international relations,
going far beyond the novelty of the Mandates system itself in its implica-
tions . . . ."I" Judge Winiarski pointed out that the wording of the
clause had been changed by the Council to make the mandatory only
subject to the court's compulsory jurisdiction 10 because "Members
of the League other than the Mandatory could not be forced against
their will to submit their differences to the Permanent Court .... M11
He concluded that if the Powers were so careful not to bind member
states without their consent, they would hardly have granted them
such a novel right of action under Article 7 without saying so ex-
pressly.3 12
The subsequent practice of the League was then cited to confirm the
contention that the court was not intended to exercise judicial control
over the mandates-a control which could only have conflicted with
that of the Council and "diluted" the latter's authority, the dissenting
judges noted."'3 In the first authoritative reports made to the Council
of the League in 1920 by the then Belgian representative on the role
of the various League organs in relation to the mandates the Permanent
Court was not mentioned.314 The League Council, throughout its twenty-
five years of existence, exercised its supervision by essentially political
methods, with the assistance of qualified experts, but without once
referring to the Permanent Court for an advisory opinion despite the
urging of the Permanent Mandates Commission.315 In the same period
307 Id. at 453 (Winiarski, President, dissenting), 559 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dis-
senting), 600-01 (van Wyk, J., dissenting), 608-09 (van Wyk, J., dissenting).
308 Id. at 600-01 (van Wyk, J., dissenting).
309 Id. at 453 (Winiarski, President, dissenting).
310 See text accompanying note 34 supra.
311 SWA Cases 453 (Winiarski, President, dissenting) quoting Viscount Ishii's report on
the reason for the change. Viscount Ishii's report is also cited at id. at 397 (separate opinion
of Jessup, J.), 597 (van Wyk, 3., dissenting).
312 SWA Cases 453 (Winiarski, President, dissenting).
313 Id. at 553-54 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, J., dissenting).
314 Id. at 451 (Winiarski, President, dissenting). The so-called "Hymans Reports," dated
Aug. 5, 1920, and Oct. 26, 1920, are also referred to in the other opinions. Id. at 352-53
(separate opinion of Bustamante, 3.), 390-92 (separate opinion of Jessup, J.), 484-85
(Spender and Fitzmaurice, 33., dissenting).
A Council report to the Assembly, dated Dec. 6, 1920, on League responsibilities under
Article 22 (mandates) similarly ignored judicial supervision. SWA Cases 451 (Winiarski,
President, dissenting).
315 Id. at 454.
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only one case was taken to the court under the adjudication clause of
any mandate; and that case involved the alleged violation of commercial
rights of a Greek national. 16 Finally, leading commentators consistently
ignored any possibility of supervision by the Permanent Court, as did
an official publication on the mandates system issued by the League
itself in 1945. 811
The majority met the respondent's arguments squarely. First of all,
they pointed out, there clearly was a dispute-a truth which U.N.
records before the court abundantly documented. 18 Secondly, the dispute
concerned the interpretation or application of the mandate. 9 Thirdly,
the dispute was within:
[T]he natural and ordinary meaning ... of "any dispute whatever" ....
The language used is broad, clear and precise: it gives rise to no ambiguity
and it permits of no exception. It refers to any dispute whatever relating...
to "the provisions" of the Mandate, obviously meaning all or any pro-
visions ....
Protection of the material interests of the Members or their
nationals is of course included within its compass, but the well-being and
development of the inhabitants of the Mandated territory are not less im-
portant.3 20
Referring first to the more technical issues of legal construction, the
concurring judges argued that the court had no right to investigate the
"jurisdictional facts" concerning the merits of the applicants' interest
as long as it related to interpretation or application of the mandate.3 21
The requirement of an "interest of a legal nature" for intervention found
in Article 62 of the court's statute was not applicable to Article 36,
which established the general jurisdiction of the court, for its jurisdic-
tion clearly included "all cases which the parties refer to it and all
matters specially provided for in the [U.N.] Charter . . . or in treaties
and conventions in force. ' 22 Moreover, the provisions of both Articles
36 and 38323 made it obvious that the scope of the court's jurisdiction,
as to facts as well as to law, depends on the will of the parties: "The
316 Ibid. See note 143 supra.
317 SWA Cases 451-52 (Winiarski, President, dissenting). judge Winiarski indicated, how-
ever, that some jurists did favor general supervision to which any League member could
subject a mandatory by bringing it before the Permanent Court. Id. at 451.
318 Id. at 381 (separate opinion of Bustamante, J.).
319 Id. at 424 (separate opinion of Jessup, 3.), 446 (separate opinion of Mbanefo, J.).
320 Id. at 343-44 (opinion of the court).
321 Id. at 423-24 (separate opinion of Jessup, 7.), 447 (separate opinion of Mbanefo, 7.).
322 Id. at 433 quoting Charter, art. 36, II 1. [Emphasis by the court.] judge Jessup pointed
out that a state is entitled to ask the court for an "abstract interpretation" of a treaty. SWA
Cases 433 (separate opinion of Jessup, J.).
323 Article 38(1) of the statute of the court defines the sources to be applied by the
court in deciding disputes in accordance with international law; they include international
conventions and custom, general principles recognized by civilized nations, and judicial
decisions and teachings of eminent scholars.
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Court is always competent once the latter [i.e., the parties] have ac-
cepted its jurisdiction, since there is no dispute which States entitled to
appear before the Court cannot refer to it."324 Finally, they found the
fact that Article 22 of the Covenant did not mention compulsory juris-
diction was no reason to interpret narrowly the adjudication clause:
Article 7 clearly implemented the securities of Article 22; it was mutually
agreed upon by the victorious Allies and proposed to the Council by
the British representative on behalf of the Union; and in the words
of Article 7: "The Mandatory agrees .... ,3'5
Judge Jessup then referred to the so-called "Tanganyika clause,"
unique to the mandate for German East Africa (Tanganyika), which
provided that League members might bring actions before the Permanent
Court on behalf of their nationals for violation of their rights. This
provision followed a compromissory clause substantially identical with
that in Article 7(2) of the South West Africa mandate. His conclusion
was that the latter must mean "something different from, or more than,
what is meant by the Tanganyika clause" or there would have been no
reason to include it.326 (The dissenters considered the Tanganyika
clause a sport and suggested that it probably was derived from the
original draft proposed by the American representative in 1919, which
was somehow not conformed to the accepted final version." 7)
On historical, ethical, and philosophic grounds the majority countered
the respondent's emphasis on the mandatories' desire for unfettered
control of conquered territory with the professed ideals of the victors
after World War L Returning to his basic theories as to the nature of
the mandates, Judge Bustamante argued that since the establishment
of Article 22 of the Covenant every League member had borne a trust,
not merely "moral" or "humanitarian," but also "undeniably legal," to
provide for the well-being and development of former colonial peoples.
Hence Article 7 must be interpreted as giving each individual member
the power to enforce the trust, more especially since the League could
not itself enter into contentious proceedings.3 28
In equally philosophical terms Judge Jessup argued that the mandates
were only one of four instances in which postwar statesmen had recog-
nized that every country had an interest in events everywhere in the
world. The others included the recognition in Article II of the Covenant
324 SWA Cases 423 (separate opinion of Jessup, J.) quoting Upper Silesia (Minority
Schools), P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 15, at 22.
325 SWA Cases 343-44 (opinion of the court).
826 Id. at 431 (separate opinion of Jessup, J.).
327 Id. at 453-54 (Winiarski, President, dissenting), 559-60 (Spender and Fitzmaurice,
JJ., dissenting).
328 Id. at 380 (separate opinion of Bustamante, J.).
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that peace was indivisible, the protection of minorities, and the estab-
lishment of the International Labor Organization. 2 9 It followed,
therefore, that Article 7 was intended "to recognize and to protect the
general interests of Members of the international community in the
Mandates System just as somewhat comparable clauses recognize this
broad interest in the minority treaties, [etc.] .... ;;3 In any case,
he pointed out, international law recognizes legal interests in issues
which do not affect the economic or other tangible interests of a state,
such as the suppression of the slave trade, the ending of forced labor,
the prevention of genocide, etc.331 A state might have a recognizable
interest in the observance in the territory of another state of general
welfare treaty provisions, he asserted, "without alleging any impact
upon its own nationals or its direct so-called tangible or material inter-
ests .... 32 In view of the broad language of Article 7 and the lack
of any intrinsic evidence of a limitation on its literal sense, the interest
of Ethiopia and Liberia in the administration of South West Africa
sufficed, particularly in view of the regional interest of all African
States in events in other parts of the same continent.33 3
Judge Jessup added, citing American cases, that there was no reason
why the court could not pass on the sort of abstract questions which
might arise if states disputed intangible interests.3 4 Nor, on the basis of
comparable objections overruled in cases relating to the minorities
treaties, would ultimate resort to the judiciary in cases which could
not be resolved politically confuse the roles of normal supervisory
organs or undermine their authority.135
No Requisite Negotiations. Since Article 7 provided compulsory
jurisdiction only as to disputes which "cannot be settled by negotiation,"
the respondent's last objection was that there had been no negotiations
at all between Ethiopia and/or Liberia on the one hand and the Re-
public of South Africa on the other.so
Assuming the existence of a dispute-which, in law, they denied-the
dissenting Commonwealth judges found that as of the date the action
was commenced there had been nothing but a disagreement between the
U.N. General Assembly as an entity and the Republic of South Africa.
329 Id. at 429 (separate opinion of Jessup, J.).
330 Id. at 432.
331 Id. at 425-28, 432.
332 Id. at 428.
333 Id. at 431-32.
334 Id. at 428-29 citing Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 244 (1879).
335 SWA Cases 432 (separate opinion of Jessup, J.).
336 Id. at 561 (Spender and Fitzmaurice, JJ., dissenting).
1964]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
[A] "negotiation" confined to the floor of an international Assembly, con-
sisting of allegations . . . resolutions . . . denial of allegations, refusal
to comply . . .cannot be enough to justify the Court in holding that the
dispute "cannot" be settled . . .when no direct diplomatic interchanges
have ever taken place between the parties . . . . [Emphasis by the
court.] 337
Furthermore, they added, the requirement of Article 7 presupposes
that the dispute is of a type inherently capable of being settled by
negotiation (or else the requirement would be meaningless). But Ethiopia
and Liberia could not make an agreement with the Republic which
would bind the Assembly or any other interested state. Hence there
was a lack of mutuality of obligation, and the dispute was nonnegoti-
able; therefore it was by its nature not subject to Article 7.331 (The
judges added that they felt that disputes as to a "sacred trust of civiliza-
tion" were inherently nonnegotiable.) 3 9
The court's answer to this objection was less concerned with the strict
legal arguments that with the factual situation. Technically, the response
was that "parliamentary diplomacy" was as adequate as direct diplo-
matic exchanges at the state level.3 4 As Judge Bustamante pointed out,
the wording of Article 7 did not prescribe any particular form of ne-
gotiation; therefore any method was sufficient which did not conflict
with international custom.3 4 ' The important point, said Judge Jessup,
was that:
Respondent was made aware of the complaints of Applicants, had an
opportunity to state its point of view, did state it, and that Applicants were
not persuaded but still maintained their positions .... 342
judge Bustamante added that he could think of no better place than
the U.N. to conduct negotiations since the litigants were represented
there by accredited diplomats and since the institution always had
available its documentation, experts, and other assistance. 43
However, the clinching fact for the majority was that there had been
permanent deadlock for fifteen years as a result of the "fundamental
opposition of points of view" and in spite of all efforts to find a "con-
337 Id. at 561-62.
338 Id. at 551-52.
339 Id. at 552.
840 Id. at 346 (opinion of the court).
If it [the issue] is one of mutual interest to many States, whether in an organized
body or not, there is no reason why each of them should go through the formality
and pretence of direct negotiation with the common adversary State after they have
already fully participated in the collective negotiations with the same State in opposition.
Ibid.
341 Id. at 384 (separate opinion of Bustamante, J.).
342 Id. at 436 (separate opinion of Jessup, 3.).
843 Id. at 384-85 (separate opinion of Bustamante, J.).
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ciliatory solution.' 344 The question, said the court, was what were the
chances of success of further interchanges; and the answer was, clearly,
nil. 45 It was left for an American summation: "In this respect States
are not eternally bound by the old adage: 'If at first you don't succeed,
try, try again.' ,46
THE NEXT SCENE
By the narrow margin of eight-seven the International Court dis-
missed the preliminary objections of the Republic of South Africa and
prepared to hear the charges against that country concerning its adminis-
tration of South West Africa. The effect of the decision was to compel
the respondent to submit evidence concerning the issues raised or to
accept, in effect, a default judgment against it.347 From its conduct the
Republic has apparently decided to argue the case on its merits.348
If the court finds the applicants' evidence as overwhelming as the vast
majority of the U.N. Assembly has, it will presumably have to decide
in favor of Ethiopia and Liberia. The most fascinating questions, there-
fore, which the (possibly) ultimate scene in the International Court will
pose are the form and scope of the judgment and the action which the
international community will take to enforce it if the South African gov-
ernment elects to flout the world's judicial authority as it has flouted its
moral judgment over the years.
344 Id. at 385.
S45 Id. at 345-46 (opinion of the court).
846 Id. at 435 (separate opinion of Jessup, J.).
347 Hence the wording of the applications: "May it please the Court, to adjudge and de-
dare, whether the Government of the Union of South Africa is present or absent ...
,that .... ." Set forth by the court, id. at 322. The memorials, set forth id. at 324, use the
same phraseology.
348 It has sought and obtained a delay for filing documents in connection with a defense
on the merits, according to a counsel for the applicants.
1964]
